Agefi Luxembourg - novembre 2026
Novembre 2026 41 AGEFI Luxembourg RH & Droit P hilanthropy has become a key feature of the global Fa milyCapital landscape. An increasing volume of private wealth is currently being transmit ted globally to the “next genera tion”. Anumber of shareholders express the desire that their princi pal holding vehicle should serve a purpose beyond the pursuit of eco nomic returns by actively suppor ting causes of general interest alongside themanagement and growth of the family estate. Themotivationsarevaried.Corporatedo nationsmayenhancethereputationofthe holding structure, embody the ethos and valuesattheheartofthefamily’scorporate identity, align with a broader allocation strategyorientedtowardssocialimpact,or simply professionalise the governance of philanthropic activities that would other wise remain fragmentedat the level of in dividual familymembers. ManysuchfamilieshavechosentheLux embourg Société de Participations Finan cières (“Soparfi”) as their top holding structure. The Soparfi is a fully taxable Luxembourg company, typically gov erned by the Law of 10 August 1915 on commercialcompanies (1) ,whoseprincipal object is to hold andmanage (significant) participations insubsidiaries.Nothing, in principle, prevents the Soparfi frompur suing,onanancillarybasis,philanthropic activities – provided such flexibility is set out in its articles of association. Yet some aspects should be kept inmind wheretheSoparfichannelsdonationstoa notforprofit organisation established by its own shareholder or shareholders. In suchcircumstances,thequestionwhether suchpaymentsmaybe recharacterisedas hidden dividend distributions ( verdeckte Gewinnausschüttungen )–withawithhold ingtaxrisk–shouldbecarefullyanalysed. It touches upon the intersection of the tax deductibility regime for charitable dona tions and the antiabuse concept devel opedunderArticle164(3)ofthe Loimodifiée du 4 décembre 1967 concernant l’impôt sur le revenu (“LITL”). The present article examines a decision of the German Federal Tax Court ( Bundesfi nanzhof ,“BFH”)of13July2021 (2) whichad dressedpreciselythisscenario.Itconsiders the extent towhich its reasoning could be transposed in Luxembourg, as this ques tion has not yet been clarified by the Lux embourg administrative courts. (3) TheGermanFederal TaxCourt Decision (BFH, 13 July 2021 – I R16/18) A. Facts The case concerned a German company whose shareholders had established a foundation( Stiftung )enjoyingpublicben efit status ( Gemeinnützigkeit ). The com pany made substantial donations to the foundation over several fiscal years. The shareholderswerethesolefoundersofthe foundation, members of its governing board,andhadthemselvesmadepersonal donationstothefoundationtothepointof having reached their own individual tax deduction entitlements. The company’s donations were directed almost exclu sively towards the foundation, with little ornodiversificationamongother charita ble beneficiaries. TheGerman tax author ities reclassified the donations as hidden distributions of profits ( verdeckte Gewin nausschüttungen ). The amount was rein tegrated into the company’s taxable income and subject to a dividend with holding tax. The company contested the assessment fromthe tax authorities. B. The “proximity link” analysis: the foundation considered as a related party of its founder Several arguments were raised by the company to challenge the existence of a “proximity link” ( nahestehende Person ) be tween the shareholders and the founda tion. Firstly, the company considered that afoundation,bynature,hasneithershare holdersnormembers.Secondly,itrecalled that the founders had no power to influ ence the foundation once constituted and finally,itunderlinedthefactthatthefoun dation’spublicbenefit status should, in it self, preclude reclassificationof donations received by the latter. The BFH rejected eachof these arguments. The Court indeed held that the existence of aproximity linkdoesnot dependupon an equity interest, amembership right, or a formal power of influence. The decisive criterion is factual: whether the company granted an advantage that it would not have granted to an unrelated third party. In reaching this conclusion, the Court re liedupon the analysis of factual elements, namely: (i) the shareholders’status as sole foundersofthefoundation;(ii)theirsimul taneouspresenceonthefoundation’sgov erning board; (iii) the concentration of the company’scharitablegivingalmostexclu sively upon the foundation; and (iv) the fact that the shareholders had reached their personal deduction limits through their owndonations to the same entity. According to the BFH, the cumulative analysis of the features mentioned above demonstrated that the company’s dona tions were not motivated by an indepen dent corporate interest in supporting a given charitable cause, but rather by the shareholders’personal“relationship”with the foundation. C. The “advantage without considera tion” analysis The company further argued that the shareholders derived no personal advan tagefromthedonations.Sincethefounda tion’s assetswere irrevocablydedicated to its statutory publicbenefit purpose and subjecttoStatesupervision,thesharehold erscouldnotderiveanyeconomicbenefit. The BFHdisagreed. Relying on its land mark jurisprudence of 18 December 1996 (4) , the Court recalled that German tax law no longer requires the share holder toderive adirect personal advan tage. To the extent that an advantage arises for the related person ( naheste hende Person ), it should be attributed to the shareholder by virtue of the proxim ity link. Even a transaction exclusively beneficial to the related party can be treated as caused by the shareholding relationship ( durch das Gesellschaftsver hältnis veranlasst ). Appliedtothefacts,the Courtfoundthatthereceiptofthedonated assetsenabledthefoundationtopursueits statutorypurposeandthatthisconstituted a sufficient advantage attributable to the shareholders, through the proximity link. The Luxembourg Framework A.Thetaxdeductionregimeforcharitable donations Under the LITL, donations to organisa tions recognisedasbeingof publicbenefit by theLuxembourgauthorities constitute a special deductible expense ( dépense spé ciale )upto20%oftotalnetincome,capped at EUR 1,000,000 per annum. (5) Founda tions holding publicbenefit status ( utilité publique ) grantedby the Luxembourg au thorities qualifyunder this regime. (6) Thequestionofcrossbordereligibilityisa topic which is often encountered in Lux embourg.Basedonastrictdomesticinter pretation, a foundation established in another EU Member State and holding publicbenefit status solely under the law of its home jurisdiction would not (auto matically)qualifyfortheLuxembourgde duction.However,theEUCourtofJustice has concluded (7)(8) that a Member State maynotlimittaxdeductibilitytodomestic organisations alonewhere a foreignbody established in another EU or EEA State pursues comparable publicinterest pur poses and satisfies equivalent conditions. B. The concept of hidden dividend distri bution under Article 164(3) LITL Article164(3)LITLprovidesthatthearm’s length principle is applicable to transac tions between a Luxembourg company and its shareholders (or any related per sons). (9) The provision does not exhaus tively define the concept of hidden dividend distribution. It refers, in broad terms,toanyadvantageconferred,directly or indirectly, by a company to a share holder,agroupcompany,oran“interested party” ( intéressé ), where an (independent) thirdpartywouldnot have received such advantage.Onceidentified,theadvantage mustbeaddedbacktothecompany’stax able income and subject to the tax treat ment applicable to dividends, including dividendwithholding tax in the hands of the shareholder. Luxembourg doctrine, inspired by Ger man jurisprudence (10) , has identified four cumulative conditions for the characteri sation of a hidden dividend distribution: (i) a decrease in the company’s net equity; (ii) a causal linkbetween thedecrease and the shareholding relationship; (iii) an im pactonthecompany’staxableincome;and (iv) the absence of a formal dividend dis tributionresolutionundercompanylaw. (11) C. The notion of “interested party” (nahestehende Person) Theconceptof“interestedparty”–equiv alent to the German nahestehende Person – isinterpretedbroadlyinLuxembourglaw. It includes anypersonhaving sufficiently closetieswiththeshareholder,withoutre quiring a direct contractual or corporate relationshipwiththecompanyitself.What matters is that the advantage received by the interested party is motivated by the shareholder’s interest. (12) Luxembourgcourtshaveappliedthisflex iblestandardacrossarangeoffactualcon figurations. (13) Thequestionthathasnotyet arisenbeforetheLuxembourgadministra tivecourtsiswhetherafoundationcreated by the shareholder – and to which the companygrants its charitabledonations – qualifies as an “interested party” for the purposes ofArticle 164(3) LITL. D.ThetransposabilityoftheBFHreason ing intoLuxembourg law Formany technical notions, theLITLwas inspired byGerman fiscal legislation. On several occasions, Luxembourg courts used BFH case law as an aid to the inter pretationoftheLITLintheabsenceofau tonomous domestic jurisprudence. Luxembourg authorities are, of course, under no obligation to follow the Ger manbased interpretation. (14) However, the conceptual framework, especially re garding hidden dividend distributions, may be sufficiently aligned to make the BFH’s reasoning directly relevant in a Luxembourg context (15) . As a conse quence,itisnotunreasonabletoanticipate that Luxembourg administrative courts, ina similar situation, could followa com parable analytical approach: treating a foundationestablishedbytheshareholder as an“interestedparty”, and recharacter izing the company’s donations as hidden dividenddistributions. Practical Takeaways Pendingadefinitivedecisionby theLux embourg courts on the scenario dis cussedabove, Luxembourgpractitioners may wish to bear in mind the following guidelines: (i) Maintain donations within the de ductiblelimitsprovidedforbyArticles109 and112LITL(20%of total net income, up toEUR1,000,000). (ii)Diversifythebeneficiariesofcharitable donations. (iii) Avoid governance overlap between shareholdersandthefoundation’sgovern ing bodies. (iv) Document the corporate rationale for each donation independently of share holder interest. Thesemeasuresdonot fullyeliminate the risk of recharacterisation but should re duceit.UntiltheLuxembourgcourtshave had the opportunity to analyse this ques tion,legaluncertainty(eveniflimited)will remain on this topic. If social impact in vesting is a coreasset classunder the fam ily investment policy, a Luxembourg societal impact company ( société d’impact sociétal )may beworth considering. Yacine DIALLO, Partner Estelle JEANVOINE, Senior Associate Sabri BOURAOUI, Associate Charles Russell Speechlys – Luxembourg (Avocats) 1) Law of 10 August 1915 on commercial compa nies,asamended. 2)BFH,13July2021–IR16/18, BStBl.II 2022,p.86. 3) As of the date of publication (and as far as we know), no decision by the Luxembourg adminis trativecourtshasaddressedthespecificscenarioof a donation by a company to a foundation estab lishedbyitsownshareholder(s). 4)BFH,Urteilvom18.Dezember1996–IR139/94, landmarkdecision,establishingthatapersonalad vantage accruing to the shareholder is no longer a prerequisite;itsufficesthattherelatedperson( nah estehendePerson )derivesthebenefit. 5)Articles109(1)3.and112oftheLITL. 6)Article112LITL. 7) CJEU, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Fi nanzamtMünchenfürKörperschaften ,CaseC386/04, 14September2006. 8)CJEU, HeinPerschev.FinanzamtLüdenscheid ,Case C318/07,27January2009. 9)Article164(3)LITL. 10)TheconceptwasinitiallydevelopedbytheGer manReichTaxCout ( Reichsfinanzhof (“RFH”)) and subsequentlyextendedandrefinedbytheGerman FederalTaxCourt( Bundesfinanzhof (“BFH”)). 11)Hoor,O., HiddenDividendDistributions&Hidden CapitalContributions ,2nded.,2023,p.23. 12)Steichen,A., Précisdedroitfiscaldel’entreprise ,6th ed.,2024,p.492. 13) See, inter alia , CAA, 9 August 2017, n°39.043; CAA,14December2017,n°39.180;TA,25Septem ber 2020, n°42.091; TA, 13 January 2021, n°43.436; TA,19December2016,n°37.261. 14)TA,26March 2026,n°45.846a) 15)Hoor,O.,op.cit.,p42.“ Thecoreofsuchcaselawis widelyacceptedinLuxembourgtaxliterature,andshould apply as it remains consistent with the spirit of the LITL (which is itselfbasedonGerman incometax law) .” Luxembourg holding companies and financing of charitable activities: Ablind spot L es entreprises luxembour geoises doivent adapter leurs politiques de rémuné ration et de gestion des ressources humaines aux attentes distinctes des salariés résidents et frontaliers. Selon le Baromètre Salariés Edenred Luxembourg, publié le 12 octobre 2026 et réalisé par le bureau d’étude Into the Minds auprès de 1.025 salariés, les deux catégories affichent des niveaux de satis faction et desmotivations différentes. Les avantages salariés satisfont 65 % des frontaliers interrogés, contre 41 % des ré sidents.Cetécarts’inscritdansuncontexte où le coût de la vie pèse sur le budget des personnes vivant auGrandDuché. Parmi les résidents, 82%citent le coût du logement comme principal frein finan cier, tandis que 72%mentionnent le coût de la vie. Les intentions de mobilité dif fèrent également. Au cours des douze prochains mois, 24 % des frontaliers en visagent de quitter leur employeur, contre 18,5 % des résidents. Les raisons avancées varient selon le profil. Lesfrontaliersaccordentdavantaged’im portance au niveau de rémunération et auxperspectivesdecarrière,tandisqueles résidentssontplussensiblesàlaqualitédu management et à l’ambiance de travail. Cesrésultatssoulignentlanécessitédedif férencierlesleviersdefidélisation.Lacom pétitivité salariale et la flexibilité sont importantes pour retenir les frontaliers. Pour les résidents, l’amélioration des pra tiquesmanagérialesetdubienêtreautra vail apparaît plus déterminante. «AuLuxembourg,larétentiondestalents nesejouepassurunseullevier»,souligne PatrickLanglois,directeurgénérald’Eden red Luxembourg. Selon lui, comprendre les attentes propres à chaque catégorie de salariésestessentielàunepolitiquederes sources humaines efficace. L’étude repose sur les réponses de 1.025 salariés actifs auLuxembourg, dont 504 résidents et 521 frontaliers originaires de France, de Belgique et d’Allemagne. Elle met en évidence les enjeux d’un marché du travail où ces deux popula tions cohabitent au sein des mêmes en treprises, sans être nécessairement motivées par les mêmes facteurs de sa tisfaction et de fidélité. Au Luxembourg, deux visions du travail ©Pexels
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