Agefi Luxembourg - septembre 2026

L es grandes entreprisesmon­ diales ont continué d’aug­ menter leurs distributions aux actionnaires aupremier trimes­ tre 2026. Les dividendesmondiaux ont atteint 424,5milliards de dol­ lars, enhausse de 10,1%sur un an. À l’inverse, les rachats d’actions ont reculé de 3,1%, à 425,7mil­ liards de dollars. Les deuxméca­ nismes représentent ainsi des montants très proches, mais évo­ luent désormais selondes dyna­ miques différentes. Selon la première édition de l’indice Janus Henderson Global Dividend and Buyback, cette évolution traduit une dif­ férence entre les deux formes de redistri­ butiondu capital. Les dividendes restent soutenus par la solidité des résultats des entreprises, tandis que les rachats d’ac­ tions sont davantage influencés par les conditions économiques et financières. Les ÉtatsUnis demeurent le premier marché mondial en matière de redistri­ bution de capital. Les entreprises amé­ ricaines ont versé 183,5milliards de dol­ lars de dividendes aupremier trimestre, soit 46,3%du total mondial, et consacré 266,7 milliards de dollars aux rachats d’actions. Laprogressiondes dividendes a concerné plusieurs secteurs, notam­ ment la technologie, les institutions financières et l’énergie. En Europe, hors RoyaumeUni, les divi­ dendes ont atteint 67,4 milliards de dol­ lars, en hausse de 35,5 % sur un an, notamment sous l’effet des variations de change et du calendrier. La Suisse arrive en tête des contributeurs européens avec 27,3 milliards de dollars distribués, devant le Danemark avec 9,4milliards. À l’échelle mondiale, le secteur financier resteleprincipalmoteurdesdistributions aux actionnaires. Les institutions finan­ cières ont versé 90,8 milliards de dollars de dividendes aupremier trimestre 2026 et occupent également la première place pour les rachatsd’actions, avec 110,7mil­ liards de dollars, soit plus d’un tiers du total mondial. Le secteur des matières premières affiche toutefois laplus forteprogression des dividendes, avec une hausse de 47,1 % sur un an. Cette croissance est portée par la demande en ressources essen­ tielles comme le cuivre et le lithium, indispensables aux infrastructures liées à l’intelligence artificielle, aux centres de données et aux semiconducteurs. Le secteur technologique continue éga­ lement de jouer un rôlemajeur, avec 43,7 milliards de dollars de dividendes ver­ sés et 66,6milliards de dollars consacrés aux rachats d’actions. Cette évolution illustre le poids croissant des entreprises technologiques dans les politiques de redistribution du capital. JanusHendersonprévoit une croissance mondiale des dividendes de 8,3 % en 2026, après 6,8%en 2025.Àl’inverse, les rachats d’actions devraient diminuer de 1,1 % cette année, après une hausse de 6,1 % en 2025. Les perspectives restent soutenues par la résistance des bénéfices, mais plu­ sieurs risques demeurent, notamment le maintiende tauxd’intérêt élevés, les ten­ sions géopolitiques et les difficultés de certains secteurs liés à la consommation. L’évolution de la conjoncture pourrait ainsi davantage peser sur les décisions de rachats d’actions que sur les poli­ tiques de dividendes. Selon Janus Henderson, les dividendes constituent ainsi un indicateur de confiance plus durable de la part des entreprises, tandis que les rachats d’ac­ tions jouent davantage un rôle d’ajus­ tement flexible en fonction de la conjoncture. Les dividendes progressent, les rachats d’actions reculent ©magnific AGEFI Luxembourg 34 Septembre 2026 Fonds &Marchés A ccording toLAIQONAsset Management, the global economic and financial order is undergoingprofound structural change. Trade flows are being reshaped, geopolitical depen­ dencies are being reassessed, and competition for technological lead­ ership and critical resources is in­ tensifying. At the same time, elevated levels of sovereigndebt are increasingly influencingmone­ tarypolicy and the overall invest­ ment landscape. These developments are converging into a new market environment that can be referred to as the ʺSPEED Regime.ʺ The term captures both the accelerating pace of structural transformation and a capital market environment in which liquidity, fiscal realities, andgeopolitical considera­ tions play an increasingly important role in asset pricing. Structural Change IsAccelerating Several longterm trends are unfolding simultaneouslyandreinforcingoneanoth­ er. These include the global race for artifi­ cial intelligence leadership, the expansion of digital infrastructure, increasing automation of industrial processes, and thestrategicpursuitofcriticalrawmateri­ als. Importantly, these developments are deeply interconnected. Artificial intelligence requires advanced semiconductors, largescale data centers, andsignificantenergyresources.Robotics and automation depend on specialized components and materials. Meanwhile, governmentsandcorporationsareinvest­ ingheavilyinmoreresilientsupplychains and reduced strategic dependencies. The result is a global investment cycle increasinglydrivenbytechnology,infras­ tructure, resource security, and geopolit­ ical positioning. For investors, thismeans that traditional geographic and sector classifications may become less relevant than identifyingcompanieswithdurable competitive advantages within critical value chains. LiquidityRemains a PowerfulMarket Driver The SPEED Regime also reflects the growing interaction between sovereign debt levels and financial conditions. Highly indebted governments depend on functioning capital markets and sus­ tainablefinancingcosts.As a result,mon­ etary policy decisions may increasingly be influenced not only by inflation and economic growth but also by fiscal and geopolitical considerations. Abundant liquidity can continue to support asset prices and encourage risktaking. However, investors shouldbe careful not to confuse liquiditydriven market strength with a reduction in underlying risks. In an environment increasingly influenced by political decisions, capital flows, andmarket narratives, fundamen­ tal analysis anddisciplined riskmanage­ ment become evenmore important. The key challenge is distinguishing between shortterm liquidity effects and longtermvalue creation. Global Equity IndicesMayBe Less DiversifiedThanTheyAppear Over the past decade, the growing popu­ larity of passive investment vehicles has resulted in significant capital inflows into marketcapitalizationweighted indices. While these vehicles offer efficiency and transparency, theydonot necessarilypro­ videbalancedexposuretotheglobalecon­ omy.LAIQONnotesthattheMSCIWorld Index, for example, remains heavily con­ centrated inNorthAmerican equities. Investors who view such benchmarks as proxiesfortheglobaleconomymayunin­ tentionallyacceptsubstantialregional,sec­ tor, and companyspecific concentration risks. This concentration has benefited investors during a period dominated by large U.S. technology companies. However, shifts in currencies, consump­ tion patterns, technological leadership, and capital allocation could result in a broaderdistributionofreturnsintheyears ahead. This should not be considered as an argument against passive investing. Rather, it is a reminder that index compo­ sitionshouldnotautomaticallybeequated withoptimal strategic asset allocation. APotential Renaissance of ActiveManagement An investment landscape characterized bygeopoliticalfragmentation,technolog­ ical disruption, and regional divergence maycreateamorefavorablebackdropfor active investment strategies. Success, however, requires managers willing to express differentiated views and con­ struct portfolios based on independent analysis. Tracking error is often viewed solely as ameasure of risk because it rep­ resents deviation from a benchmark. Yet inconcentratedmarkets,ahighertracking error can also reflect deliberate diversifi­ cation andawillingness to seekopportu­ nities beyond the most heavily weighted index constituents. While low tracking errormay reduce the risk of underperforming a benchmark over short periods, it does not necessarily reducetheabsoluterisksembeddedwith­ in that benchmark. If an index itself is highlyconcentrated,benchmarkoriented portfolios will inevitably inherit much of that concentration. In LAIQON’s view, active portfolio positioning is not regard­ ed as an end in itself. Meaningful devia­ tions frombenchmarks should be rooted in robust investment convictions, disci­ plinedcompanyanalysis,andtransparent risk budgeting. Asia Is Becoming Increasingly Strategic forGlobal Investors Asia is emerging as one of the defining regions of the newmarket regime. South Korea and Taiwan occupy critical posi­ tions in the global semiconductor ecosys­ tem, while Japan andChina remain lead­ ers in robotics and automation. At the same time, countries such as India, Indonesia, and Vietnam are gaining importance as both manufacturing hubs and consumer markets. The region com­ bines several powerful structural growth drivers, such as technological innovation and industrial scale, expanding domestic consumer markets, rising investment in digitalization and automation, strategic importance within global supply chains oraccessto,andprocessingof,criticalraw materials. Nevertheless, Asia should not beviewedasauniforminvestmentoppor­ tunity. Regulatory frameworks, gover­ nance standards, political risks, andmar­ ket structures vary considerably across countries. This diversity reinforces the importance of selective and active invest­ ment approaches. Critical RawMaterialsAreBecoming a Strategic Investment Theme The global competition for rare earths andother criticalminerals is intensifying because these resources are essential for many futureoriented industries, includ­ ing semiconductors, energy infrastruc­ ture, automation, digital technologies, anddefense applications. China current­ lyholds a strong strategicposition insev­ eral critical segments of the rare earth value chain. At the same time, govern­ ments around theworld are investing in alternative supplysources, domesticpro­ duction capabilities, and more diversi­ fied processing networks. For investors, opportunities can emerge across the entirevalue chain, fromexplo­ rationandextraction toprocessing, recy­ cling, infrastructure, andmaterial substi­ tution. However, these industries are often exposed to commodity price fluc­ tuations, regulatory risks, environmental considerations, and geopolitical devel­ opments,makingcareful company selec­ tion essential. Conclusion: BenchmarkThinking AloneMayNo Longer Be Enough The emerging investment regime is char­ acterized by an unusual combination of rapidstructuralchange,geopoliticalrival­ ry, high sovereign debt levels, technologi­ cal transformation, and shifting regional growth dynamics. From LAIQON’s per­ spective, investors should avoid relying exclusively on the patterns and winners of the past decade. Regional concentra­ tions,sectorexposures,currencyrisks,and geopolitical dependencies deserve closer scrutiny than theyhave in recent years. Active investment management has the potential to create value in such an envi­ ronment, provided it is supported by rigorous analysis, longterm thinking, and thewillingness to challenge conven­ tional benchmark allocations. The SPEED Regime does not necessarily require investors to move faster. It requires them to think more broadly, more globally, andmore selectively. ANew Regime for Capital Markets: Why Investors Should Think More Globally and MoreActively ȱ ȱ DASHBOARD ȱȱ AGEFI ȱ Luxembourg ȱ 31 Ȭ Aug Ȭ 2026 ȱ 31 Ȭ Dec Ȭ 2025 ȱ DIFF ȱ % ȱ ȱ ȱȱ Dow ȱ 30 ȱ (DJI) ȱ 53,185.90 ȱ 48,063.29 ȱ 10.66% ȱ ȱ ȱ S&P ȱ 500 ȱ (GSPC) ȱ 7,686.14 ȱ 6,845.50 ȱ 12.28% ȱ ȱ ȱ Euro ȱ Stoxx ȱ 50 ȱ 6,420.16 ȱ 5,796.22 ȱ 10.76% ȱ ȱ ȱ DAX ȱ (GDAXI) ȱ 26,258.11 ȱ 24,490.41 ȱ 7.22% ȱ ȱ ȱ CAC ȱ 40 ȱ (FCHI) ȱ 8,334.50 ȱ 8,149.50 ȱ 2.27% ȱ ȱ ȱ FTSE ȱ 100 ȱ (FTSE) ȱ 10,824.90 ȱ 9,931.40 ȱ 9.00% ȱ ȱ ȱ LuxX ȱ index ȱ 2,001.95 ȱ 1,795.46 ȱ 11.50% ȱ ȱ ȱ Nikkei ȱ 225 ȱ (N225) ȱ 66,301.93 ȱ 50,339.48 ȱ 31.71% ȱ ȱ ȱ Shanghai ȱ (SHCOMP) ȱ 3,986.30 ȱ 3,968.84 ȱ 0.44% ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ US ȱ Fed ȱ Funds ȱ Rate ȱȱ 3.63% ȱ 3.72% ȱ Ȭ 0.09% ȱ ȱ ȱ 3 ȱ Month ȱ US ȱ Treasury ȱ Rate ȱ 3.91% ȱ 3.67% ȱ 0.24% ȱ ȱ ȱ 5 ȱ Year ȱ US ȱ Treasury ȱ Rate ȱ 4.49% ȱ 3.73% ȱ 0.76% ȱ ȱ ȱ 10 ȱ Year ȱ US ȱ Treasury ȱ Rate ȱ 4.75% ȱ 4.18% ȱ 0.57% ȱ ȱ ȱ European ȱ Central ȱ Bank ȱ (ECB) ȱ Refinancing ȱ Rate ȱ 2.65% ȱ 2.15% ȱ 0.50% ȱ ȱ ȱ 5 Ȭ Year ȱ Eurozone ȱ Central ȱ Government ȱ Bond ȱ 3.25% ȱ 2.62% ȱ 0.63% ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Barrel ȱ (West ȱ Texas ȱ Intermediate) ȱ 0.4655 ȱ 0.3075 ȱ 51.39% ȱ € ȱ West ȱ Texas ȱ Intermediate ȱ (prix ȱ en ȱ euro ȱ par ȱ litre) ȱ Natural ȱ gas: ȱ 1 ȱ m3= ȱ 0.0882 ȱ 0.1111 ȱ Ȭ 20.61% ȱ € ȱ Natural ȱ Gas, ȱ Henry ȱ Hub Ȭ I ȱ (prix ȱ en ȱ euro ȱ par ȱ m3) ȱ Natural ȱ gas: ȱ 1MWh= ȱ 8.51 ȱ 10.72 ȱ Ȭ 20.61% ȱ € ȱ Natural ȱ Gas, ȱ Henry ȱ Hub Ȭ I ȱ (prix ȱ en ȱ euro ȱ par ȱ MWh) ȱ Natural ȱ gas: ȱ 1 ȱ MMbtu= ȱ 2.89 ȱ 3.69 ȱ Ȭ 21.68% ȱ $ ȱ Natural ȱ Gas, ȱ Henry ȱ Hub Ȭ I ȱ (prix ȱ en ȱ $ ȱ par ȱ MMbtu) ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Gold: ȱ 1 ȱ Kg= ȱ 122,904.41 ȱ 118,470.86 ȱ 3.74% ȱ € ȱ ȱ Gold: ȱ 1 ȱ oz= ȱ 4,430.19 ȱ 4,328.60 ȱ 2.35% ȱ $ ȱ ȱ Silver: ȱ 1 ȱ Kg= ȱ 1,838.49 ȱ 1,951.16 ȱ Ȭ 5.77% ȱ € ȱ ȱ Silver: ȱ 1 ȱ oz= ȱ 66.27 ȱ 71.29 ȱ Ȭ 7.04% ȱ $ ȱ ȱ Government ȱ Debt/GDP ȱ last ȱ ȱ previous ȱ ȱ trends ȱ last ȱ source ȱ Japan ȱ 229.0% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2026 ȱ 236.6% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ Ȭ 7.6% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.) ȱ Singapore ȱ 167.4% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2026 ȱ 166.7% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 0.7% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.)/most ȱ of ȱ the ȱ debt ȱȱ reinvested ȱ in ȱ Singapore ȱ domestic ȱ assets ȱ Greece ȱ 137.0% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2026 ȱ 143.6% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ Ȭ 6.6% ȱ AOL ȱ (est.) ȱ Italy ȱ 138.9% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 137.1% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 1.8% ȱ Eurostat ȱ Senegal ȱ 132.3% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 118.8% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2024 ȱ 13.5% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.)/Ecofin: ȱ 122.9% ȱ after ȱ rebasing ȱ USA ȱ 125.0% ȱ Aug. ȱ 2026 ȱ 125.3% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ Ȭ 0.3% ȱ Council ȱ on ȱ Foreign ȱ Relations ȱ (CFR) ȱ (est.) ȱ France ȱ 117.6% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 115.6% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 2.0% ȱ Insee ȱ Canada ȱ 110.7% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2026 ȱ 112.9% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ Ȭ 2.2% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.) ȱ Belgium ȱ 109.1% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 107.5% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 1.6% ȱ Eurostat ȱ UK ȱ 104.0% ȱ Apr. ȱ 2026 ȱ 101.3% ȱ Aug. ȱ 2025 ȱ 2.7% ȱ IMF ȱȱ Spain ȱ 101.6% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 100.4% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 1.2% ȱ Eurostat ȱ China ȱ 96.0% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2026 ȱ 94.0% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 2.0% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.) ȱ World ȱ 94.0% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 92.3% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2024 ȱ 1.7% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.) ȱ Portugal ȱ 92.9% ȱ Jun. ȱ 2026 ȱ 91.0% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 1.9% ȱ Banco ȱ de ȱ Portugal ȱ Eurozone ȱ 88.9% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 87.8% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 1.1% ȱ Eurostat ȱ Finland ȱ 89.8% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 88.5% ȱ Nov. ȱ 2025 ȱ 1.3% ȱ Eurostat ȱ Austria ȱ 83.5% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 81.5% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 2.0% ȱ Statistics ȱ Austria ȱ OECD ȱ 85.0% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2026 ȱ 83.0% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 2.0% ȱ OECD ȱ (est.) ȱ EU ȱ 82.9% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 82.1% ȱ Sep. ȱ 2025 ȱ 0.8% ȱ Eurostat ȱ Brazil ȱ 81.9% ȱ Jun. ȱ 2026 ȱ 80.4% ȱ Apr. ȱ 2026 ȱ 1.5% ȱ Zonebourse ȱ India ȱ 80.8% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2026 ȱ 81.1% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ Ȭ 0.3% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.) ȱ Brazil ȱ 80.4% ȱ Apr. ȱ 2026 ȱ 78.7% ȱ Jan. ȱ 2026 ȱ 1.7% ȱ Zonebourse ȱ South ȱ Africa ȱ 78.9% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2026 ȱ 77.8% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 1.1% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.) ȱ Hungary ȱȱ 74.8% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 74.6% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 0.2% ȱ Eurostat ȱ Argentina ȱ 70.4% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2026 ȱ 78.8% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ Ȭ 8.4% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.) ȱ Israel ȱ 69.0% ȱ Jul. ȱ 2026 ȱ 68.6% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 0.4% ȱ Ministry ȱ of ȱ Finance ȱ ( ȱ est.) ȱ Poland ȱ 64.2% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 62.3% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 1.9% ȱ Eurostat ȱ Germany ȱ 63.5% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 62.2% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2024 ȱ 1.3% ȱ Bundesbank ȱ Korea ȱ 54.0% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2026 ȱ 51.7% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 2.3% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.) ȱ Mexico ȱ 53.6% ȱ Jul. ȱ 2026 ȱ 47.7% ȱ Sep. ȱ 2024 ȱ 5.9% ȱ IMF ȱ Sub Ȭ Saharan ȱ Africa ȱ 53.1% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 57.2% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2024 ȱ Ȭ 4.1% ȱ Gabon ȱ Media ȱ Line ȱ (GMT) ȱ Australia ȱ 51.5% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2026 ȱ 51.4% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 0.1% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.) ȱ Netherlands ȱ 43.8% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 44.4% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ Ȭ 0.6% ȱ Eurostat ȱ Norway ȱ 42.9% ȱ Apr. ȱ 2026 ȱ 43.0% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ Ȭ 0.1% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.) ȱ Indonesia ȱ 41.3% ȱ Jun. ȱ 2026 ȱ 40.4% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 0.9% ȱ VOI ȱ Switzerland ȱ 39.9% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 39.8% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2024 ȱ 0.1% ȱ IMF ȱ Ireland ȱ 37.0% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 32.9% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 4.1% ȱ National ȱ Treasury ȱ Management ȱ Agency ȱ Sweden ȱ 36.3% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 35.1% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 1.2% ȱ Trading ȱ Economics ȱ Nigeria ȱ 32.3% ȱ Jun. ȱ 2026 ȱ 36.1% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2023 ȱ Ȭ 3.8% ȱ IMF ȱ (est.) ȱ Luxembourg ȱȱ 29.2% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 27.9% ȱ Sep. ȱ 2025 ȱ 1.3% ȱ Eurostat ȱ Denmark ȱ 26.8% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 29.7% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2025 ȱ Ȭ 2.9% ȱ Eurostat ȱ Turkiye ȱ 23.8% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2025 ȱ 24.5% ȱ Sep. ȱ 2025 ȱ Ȭ 0.7% ȱ Ministry ȱ of ȱ Finance ȱ Russia ȱ 15.6% ȱ Mar. ȱ 2026 ȱ 16.4% ȱ Dec. ȱ 2024 ȱ Ȭ 0.8% ȱ MSN: ȱ President ȱ Poutin ȱ to ȱ AFP ȱ Large ȱ differences ȱ may ȱ exist ȱ due ȱ to ȱ the ȱ definition ȱ of ȱ public ȱ debt ȱ (gross ȱ vs. ȱ net ȱ debt, ȱ government ȱ financial ȱ assets, ȱ etc.) ȱ ȱ This ȱ dashboard, ȱ exclusive ȱ to ȱ AGEFI ȱ Luxembourg, ȱ allows ȱ the ȱ reader: ȱȱ 1° ȱ to ȱ see ȱ the ȱ returns ȱ of ȱ the ȱ main ȱ assets ȱ and ȱ financial ȱ indices ȱ for ȱ the ȱ current ȱ year ȱ / ȱȱ 2° ȱ to ȱ see ȱ on ȱ one ȱ page ȱ the ȱ main ȱ stock ȱ market ȱ indices ȱ and ȱ interest ȱ rates ȱ / ȱȱ 3° ȱ to ȱ know ȱ the ȱ production ȱ cost ȱ of ȱ several ȱ energy ȱ products ȱ in ȱ euros, ȱ to ȱ compare ȱ with ȱ the ȱ retail ȱ price ȱ / ȱȱ 4° ȱ to ȱ know ȱ the ȱ price ȱ of ȱ gold ȱ and ȱ silver ȱ in ȱ kilos ȱ and ȱ in ȱ euros. ȱ / ȱȱ 5° ȱ to ȱ immediately ȱ see ȱ the ȱ public ȱ date/GDP ȱ for ȱ several ȱ significant ȱ countries ȱȱ (2022 ȱ trend) ȱ / ȱȱ ȱ ©magnific