Agefi Luxembourg - novembre 2026

AGEFI Luxembourg 28 Novembre 2026 Fonds &Marchés What Case C63/25 Means for European Investment Funds By Dr. Sebastiaan Niels HOOGHIEMSTRA* and Gabriel STORM** T he EuropeanUnionCourt of Justice’s (theCourt) judg­ ment of 15October 2026 (the Judgment) inCaseC63/25 answers a deceptively simple question: canprovisions contai­ ned in the constitutional docu­ ments of an investment fund constitute contractual terms sub­ ject to EUconsumer law? This question is particularly important for investment funds, which traditionally dis­ tinguishbetween constitutional documents and con­ tractualarrangementswithinvestors.Fundrules,arti­ cles of association and instruments of incorporation establishtheorganisationofthevehicleandtherights attachingtoitsunitsorshares.Consumerlaw,bycon­ trast, is concerned with contractual relationships between consumers andprofessional counterparties. TheJudgmentshowsthatthisdistinctionisnotalways decisive: investorfacing provisions in constitutional documents can also formpart of the contractual rela­ tionshipbetween the fund and its investors. In its Judgment, the Court confirms that the formal locationof aprovision is not decisive.Where an indi­ vidual investor subscribes directly into a fund and investorfacingprovisions in the constitutional docu­ ments define the conditions for redemption, those provisions can form part of the contractual relation­ ship for purposes of Directive 93/13/EEC (“ Unfair TermsDirective” ).Indoingso,theCourtsubstantially followed the functional approach proposed by AdvocateGeneral Biondi. The Judgment is significant for retailfacing invest­ ment funds. Its practical consequences are, however, more specific and jurisdictiondependent than the headline proposition suggests. The keyquestions are wheremandatoryfundregulationends,andcontrac­ tual product design begins, andwhether the retail or HNWI client is the fund’s legal investor. Fromfund law to consumer law The case at hand concerned three individuals who acquired investment certificates in a Polish closed­ endedinvestmentfund.Eachacquiredtwocertificates valued at PLN 186,714.14 each (approximately EUR 44,290),aftersigningstandarddocumentationaccept­ ing the issue terms and the fund statutes. Whentheysubsequentlyrequestedredemptionofall their certificates, the fund relied on a provision per­ mittingittoreduceredemptionrequests.Thereferring Polish court asked, among other things, whether the Unfair Terms Directive applied to the relationship between the fund and the individual investors, and whether provisions in the fund statutes could consti­ tute nonnegotiated contractual terms. TheJudgmentmatterslessfortheredemptiondispute than for the Court’s methodology. A provision does not fall outside consumerlaw scrutiny merely because it appears in fund statutes or another consti­ tutional document. The Court distinguished provi­ sions concerning the fund’s constitution and organi­ zationfromprovisionsgoverningthecontractualrela­ tionshipbetween the fundandan investor.Wherean investorsubscribesdirectlyintothefundandaprovi­ sion determines redemption or another investorfac­ ing economic right, that provision may form part of the subscription relationship. This does not mean that every provision in a fund’s constitutional documents becomes a consumer term. Organisational provisions concerning matters such asthefund’sname,seatorrepresentationaredifferent fromprovisions determining an investor’s economic rights.Redemptionrights,fees,compulsoryredemp­ tionandvaluationmechanisms sitmuchcloser to the contractual relationship with the investor and may therefore fall within the scope of the Unfair Terms Directive.Thedistinctionisthereforenotbetweencon­ stitutional documents and contracts as such. It is betweenprovisionsgoverningthefund’sorganization and provisions forming part of its contractual rela­ tionshipwith investors. Aclosedended fund that was not entirely closedended Thefactsarealsoimportantbecausethefundwasfor­ mally closedended, but its statutes nevertheless allowed investors to request redemption of their cer­ tificates, subject to a liquidity limitation. This was therefore not a conventional closedended vehicle, in which investors generally have no standing right to exitbeforetheendofthefund’slife.Economically,the arrangementresemblesfeaturesfoundintenderoffer and semiliquid funds. European fundproducts increasinglysit between the traditional openended and closedended models. Investors can have periodic liquidity rights, tender opportunities,noticeperiods,gatesordeferredsettle­ mentdesignedtoreconcileinvestorliquiditywiththe liquidity of the underlyingportfolio. These mechanisms are commercially necessary, but they also determine when and to what extent investors can exit and may leave material choices to thefundoritsmanager.Therelevantquestionisthere­ fore:wheredoesmandatory regulationendandcon­ tractual choice begin? Mandatory regulation or contractual choice? Article 1(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive excludes contractual terms reflecting mandatory statutory or regulatoryprovisionsfromtheDirective’sscope.That distinction is particularly important for regulated in­ vestment funds. European fund legislation often es­ tablishes the framework for liquidity mechanisms withoutdeterminingeveryparameter.Regulationcan prescribe or permit redemption and liquidityman­ agement tools, while the fund documentation deter­ mines matters such as frequency, notice periods, thresholdsorallocationmechanics.Therelevantques­ tion iswhether the applicable legislationdeter­ mines the content of the investorfacing provi­ sionor leaves themanager or boarddiscretion over its precise terms. TheCourthasheldthatacontractualtermcan reflectamandatoryprovisionwithoutre­ producing the statutory wording verbatim.Whatmattersissubstan­ tive equivalence. A provision im­ plementing a mandatory statutory or regulatory requirement has a strong basis for exclusion underAr­ ticle1(2)oftheUnfairTermsDirective. Where regulation permits a range of solutions and the fundchooses thepre­ cise parameters, those parameters are more readily characterized as an au­ tonomous contractual choice. Thisdoesnotmean that the termisunfair. TheCourt didnotdecidethatquestion.Liquidityrestrictionscan be necessary to protect remaining investors, avoid forced sales and ensure that the redemption profile remains compatible with the underlying portfolio. Nor is contractual discretion itself problematic. The question is whether the resulting provision is trans­ parent andcanbe justifiedby reference to the regula­ tory and economic architecture of the product. Who is actually the investor? A second, more practical issue concerns the identity of the investor. The individuals in C63/25 invested directly as natural persons in the fund, signed stan­ dard documentation and accepted the fund statutes. European retail and privatewealth investments do not always use such a direct bilateral structure, espe­ cially in Luxembourg. An individual can have eco­ nomic exposure to a fund through a lifeinsurance product,pensionarrangement,privatebank,platform or nominee structure. In those cases, a professional intermediary may be the investor appearing in the fund’s register, while the individual has a separate contractual claimagainst the intermediary. This does not put intermediated distribution outside consumer protection. The relationship between the individualandtheinsurer,pensionprovider,bankor platformremainssubjecttotheapplicablelegalframe­ work. It does, however, change the contractual nexus thatmatteredinC63/25.Wheretheprofessionalinter­ mediary is the registered investor, it is less straight­ forward to characterize the underlying fund’s consti­ tutional documents as terms of a direct contract betweenthefundandtheconsumer.Forasubstantial part of European retail and privatewealth distribu­ tion, thismay thereforebe themost important practi­ cal limitationof the Judgment. Semiliquid and tenderoffer funds This case is also relevant for tenderoffer and other semiliquidstructures.Inthesefunds,investorliquid­ ity does not always take the form of a standing redemptionentitlement.Instead,thefundcanprovide periodic opportunities to tender interests, subject to conditions relating to timing, size, available liquidity and the allocation of oversubscribed requests. The fund, itsmanager or its boardmay retain substantial control over the investor’s exit mechanism. Where regulation leaves material room to determine those parameters, the mechanism moves away from the implementationofmandatory lawandcloser to con­ tractual product design. For a product marketed directly to retail investors, three elements matter in particular: direct accession to the fund, standardized documentation and con­ tractual discretion over investor liquidity. Together, those elements resemble the factual and legal frame­ work considered by the Court. The practical answer is not to eliminate necessary liquiditymanagement mechanisms. Managers should instead ensure that discretionaryprovisions have clear triggers, objective allocation criteria, appropriate conflicts safeguards and a demonstrable relationship with the fund’s investment and liquidity strategy. UCITS&ELTIFs: different products, same question The balance differs across fund types. For UCITS, redemption and liquidity management are already subject to detailed EU regulation. The scope for con­ tractualchoicemustthereforebeassessedagainstthat regulatoryframework.Part2UCIscanaccommodate abroaderrangeofinvestmentstrategiesandliquidity arrangements,soredemptionfrequencies,noticeperi­ ods, gates and deferred settlement can dependmore heavily on product design. ELTIFs sit somewhere between the two: Article 18 of the ELTIF Regulation regulatesinliferedemptions,whiletherulesorinstru­ ments of incorporation set out the relevant proce­ dures. In each case, the relevant issue iswhichpart of the investor’s liquidity right comes from regulation andwhichpart comes fromthe fund’s owndesign. What should fundmanagers do? TheproportionateresponsetoC63/25isnottorecon­ sider the entire constitutional architecture of European investment funds. Managers should start with the distribution chain and the provisions that actually determine investor economics. Managers shouldaskthreequestions.First,istheinvestoracon­ sumer and is that person the legal investor in the fund?Second,whichprovisionsmateriallydetermine that investor’s economic rights? Third, does the rele­ vantprovisionimplementamandatorylegalrequire­ ment, operationalize a regulatory frameworkwithin prescribedlegalboundariesorreflectanautonomous productdesign choice? If it is the latter, a separate questionarises: is the termunfair?TheCourt didnot decide that issue. The assessment described above is particularly rele­ vant for directly distributed retail products, and for tenderoffer and semiliquid products. Where the fund or manager determines material parameters, thedocumentation shouldstate those choices clearly andstructurethemobjectively.Bycontrast,theimme­ diate implications may be more limited in heavily intermediated distribution because the individual may have nodirect contractual relationshipwith the underlying fund. Conclusion TheJudgmentremovesaformalsafeharbourbycon­ firmingthataprovisioncannotbetreatedasimmune from consumerlaw scrutiny simply because it appears in a fund’s constitutional documents. It does not, however, turn fund statutes into ordinary con­ sumer contracts or subject ordinary liquidity man­ agement tools to a general consumerlaw veto. For fundmanagers,thestartingpointshouldnotbewhere a provision appears. They should ask who the legal investor is, how the provision regulates the relation­ ship between the investor and the fund and how much of its content is dictated by regulation rather thanby the fund’s ownproduct design. Thedividing lineafterC63/25isnotsimplybetweenfundlawand consumer law. It is between regulatory architecture and contractual choice. *Dr.SebastiaanHooghiemstra isaseniorassociateintheinvestment management practice of Loyens &Loeff Luxembourg. **Gabriel Storm is an associate in the financial regulatory practice of Loyens &Loeff in the Netherlands. When Fund Statutes Become Consumer Terms L e gestionnaire dʹactifs immobiliers Crayon Partners, société fondée en février 2024, a aujourdʹhui acquis la confiance dʹune quarantaine de family of­ fices et dʹinvestisseurs privés luxembour­ geois, belges, espagnols et français. Disposant de bureaux à Paris, Londres et Luxembourg, Crayon Partners a identifié un défi structurel majeur en Europe : le fi­ nancement de lʹimmobilier via des modes alternatifs. « Living » et actifs alternatifs « Lemarché immobilier européen fait face à de pro­ fondes mutations structurelles liées, entre autres, à lʹurbanisationouencoreauvieillissementdelapopu­ lation », expliquait récemment Thibault Weston Smith, cofondateur et Managing Partner de Crayon Partners, à la tribune de lʹEcofinClub Luxembourg. Autre constat : les prix des logements ont, globale­ ment,grimpétroisàcinqfoisplusvitequelesrevenus au cours de la dernière décennie. Face à ces défis, les investisseurs se tournent également volontiers vers des classes dʹactifs alternatives, comme le secteur du « Living », qui englobe notamment les logements étudiants et les résidences seniors. RenttoOwn : une solution londonienne Pourprendre lʹexempledeLondres, lʹâgemoyendes primoaccédants, la cible privilégiée de Crayon Partners, atteint aujourdʹhui 43 ans (contre 28 ans en 2008). Un ménage londonien consacre en moyenne lʹéquivalent de 14 années de revenus pour devenir propriétaire dʹun bien immobilier. Crayon Jaune, le fonds luxembourgeois initié et géré par Crayon Partners, déploie depuis peudans la capitale britannique une stratégie novatrice bap­ tisée « RenttoOwn » (RTO). Ce modèle hybride (locationaccession) permet aux locataires, sélec­ tionnés sur la base de critères précis (via lʹOpen Banking en GrandeBretagne), de convertir 100 % de leurs loyers en apport sur une période de deux ans, leur offrant ainsi un chemin balisé vers la pro­ priété sans apport initial prohibitif. ÀParis aussi Unportefeuilledʹunecentainedʹappartementsneufs a été constitué ces derniers mois dans le « Second Circle » de Londres (Ealing, Lambeth, Wembley…), illustrant lʹimpact social de ce fonds Crayon Jaune. Sur le même modèle RTO, une vingtaine dʹopéra­ tions immobilières dumême type ont été engagées à Paris, en première couronne. « Si notre vision est clairement paneuropéenne, Londres, compte tenu de son énorme potentiel en matière de RTO, restera notre priorité pour ces pro­ chaines années », conclut ThibaultWeston Smith. Hugo LEBLUD Ecofin Club Luxembourg Le « Rent-to-Own » pour devenir propriétaire à Londres

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