Agefi Luxembourg - octobre 2026

AGEFI Luxembourg 26 Octobre 2026 Marchés &Wealth Revisiting the Defined Investment Policy Requirement By Dr. Sebastiaan Niels HOOGHIEMSTRA* & Gabriel STORM**, Loyens & Loeff T he concept of an alternative investment fund (“AIF”) has been the subject of ex­ tensive regulatory and academic debate since the adoption of the Alternative Investment FundMa­ nagersDirective (“AIFMD”). Des­ pite the broadwording of theAIF definition, it has long been accep­ ted that not every vehicle that raises capital and invests assets qualifies as anAIF. Listed investment holding companies such as Berk­ shireHathaway, listedprivate equityvehicles, special purpose acquisition companies (“ SPACs ”), treasury companies holding concentrated exposures to gold, infrastructure or digital assets, and familycontrolled investment conglomerates may all raise and deploy capitalwiththeobjectiveofgeneratinginvestmentre­ turns. Yet none of these vehicles is automatically treated as anAIF. If the mere raising and investment of capitalwere sufficient to bring a vehiclewithin the scope of AIFMD, a substantial part of the corporate sector couldpotentiallybe caught by the regime. The distinctionbetweenanAIFandanordinarycommer­ cialorlistedinvestmentholdingcompanymustthere­ fore be found elsewhere. One of the key elements of theAIFdefinitionistherequirementthatcapitalisin­ vestedinaccordancewithadefinedinvestmentpolicy. Traditionally, this requirement is analyzed as one of several conditions that must be satisfied for a vehicle to qualify as anAIF. This contribution argues that its significancemay bemore fundamental. Thedefinedinvestmentpolicyrequirementmaypro­ videaconceptualexplanationforthedividinglinebe­ tween investment funds and listed investment holding companies. Rather than focusing exclusively on the nature of the underlying investments, the re­ quirement directs attention to the basis onwhich in­ vestors commit their capital and the extent to which management remains bound by that mandate. Viewedthroughthatlens,theconceptofadefinedin­ vestmentpolicymayhelpexplainwhycertaincorpo­ rate listed investment holding companies fall outside theAIFframeworkeventhoughtheyengageinactiv­ ities that, at first sight, closely resemble those ofAIFs. The limits of traditional approaches For many years, regulators have distinguishedAIFs from ordinary undertakings by asking whether a vehicle pursues a general commercial or industrial purpose. ESMA’s guidance indicates that an under­ taking is generallynot a collective investment under­ takingwhere its principal activity is trading goods or commodities,providingnonfinancialservices,man­ ufacturing, or propertydevelopment. Thedistinction matters,butitdoesnotsettleeverycase.Difficultcases rarely involve a factory at one end of the spectrum anda portfolio of securities at the other. They involve vehicles that acquire, hold, develop and dispose of assets, often with varying degrees of operational involvement. Private equity funds may influence the strategy of a portfolio company, replace its management and im­ plementoperationalimprovements.Aninfrastructure fundmay acquire assets and hold them for decades. Alisted investment holding companymay have few employees and derive most of its economic activity fromallocatingcapitalamongitsinvestments.Invest­ ment and commercial activity are therefore not mu­ tually exclusive categories. The holdingcompany exclusion does not fully resolve the difficulty either. TheAIFMDdefines aholdingcompanyby reference to the pursuit of a business strategy through sub­ sidiaries, associated companies or participations in order to contribute to their longtermvalue, together with additional criteria concerning listing or the gen­ erationof returns throughdisposals. Thesecriteriaareuseful,buttheydonoteliminatedif­ ficultborderlinecases.Longtermvaluecreationisnot unique to corporate groups. Private equityand infra­ structure funds may actively develop portfolio com­ panies and hold investments for many years. Conversely,ordinarycompaniesmayacquireanddis­ poseofsubsidiariesaspartoftheircorporatestrategy. Traditional tests identify relevant characteristics, but theydonot always explain the boundary. The defined investment policy as a governance concept The boundarybecomes clearer once the focusmoves from what the vehicle owns to how the capital providersconstrainwhatmanagementmaydo.Arti­ cle4(1)(a)AIFMDdefinesanAIFasacollectiveinvest­ mentundertakingwhichraisescapitalfromanumber of investors with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for their benefit. ESMA’s guidance identifies several characteristics of adefinedinvestmentpolicy.Thepolicyshouldbede­ terminedandfixed,atthelatest,wheninvestors’com­ mitmentsbecomebinding; be set out inor referenced by the constitutional documents; be legally enforce­ ableagainsttheundertakingoritsmanager;andcon­ tain investment guidelines relating, for example, to assetclasses,investmentstrategy,geography,leverage, holding periods or diversification. The keyword is therefore “defined”. Defined investment policies es­ tablishtheframeworkwithinwhichinvestmentdeci­ sions may be made. It is agreed before investors commitcapitalandconstrainsthediscretionthatmay subsequently be exercised by the manager. This makes the concept less about thenatureof the invest­ ment and more about the governance framework withinwhich it ismanaged. That does not mean that anAIFMmust have no dis­ cretion. ESMAexpressly recognizes that investment decisionsmayremainsubjecttosignificantdiscretion. What matters is that the discretion operates within a defined investment policy rather than allowing the manager to replace the policy itself throughordinary investment decisions. The relevant question is there­ fore not whether management has choices. It is whethermanagementcanfundamentallychangethe frameworkwithinwhich those choices aremade. Corporate governance versus fund governance Generally, companies pursue corporate purposes, withinwhich their boards generally have broad dis­ cretion to determine how that purpose is achieved, including by entering new mar­ kets, disposing of activities or redirecting capital, subject to the articles of association, applicable law and shareholderreserved matters. Funds operate within a different governance framework, in which the manager’s discretion is con­ strainedbytheinvestmentstrat­ egy agreedwith investors. Board discretion derives from corporatelawandthecompany’s constitutional framework. AIFMdiscretionderives from, and is constrained by, an investment mandate agreedwith investors (i.e., a binding investment policy). The distinction becomes particularly apparent when the investment poli­ cy changes. For a closedended fund, a material changetotheinvestmentpolicywilltypicallyengage the amendmentmechanisms of the limitedpartner­ ship agreement or other constitutional documents. The sponsor or general partner may propose the change, but investor approval may be required before it becomes effective. For anopenended fund, the protectionmay instead lie in the investor’s ability to exit. Depending on the applicableproduct andnational rules, investorsmay insteadreceivepriornoticeandanopportunitytore­ deem without additional charges before a material change takes effect. Themechanisms differ, but their function is similar: investors should not simply be locked into a materially different investment man­ date from the one on which they committed their capital. This fundamentallydiffers fromanordinary corporate shareholder, where shareholders acquire interests in companies whose boards may generally changebusinessstrategythroughordinarycorporate governance, subject to the applicable corporate and constitutional constraints. Thedecisivequestionisthereforenotsimplywhether capitalisinvested,butwhetherinvestorscommitcap­ ital on the basis of a predefined investmentmandate that constrains management and cannot be materi­ ally replaced through ordinary management deci­ sionmaking or instead invest in a company whose boardretainsthefreedomtoredefineitsstrategyover time.ThisisconsistentwithBaFin’spositionthatade­ finedinvestmentstrategydiffersfromageneralbusi­ ness strategy in that the investment criteria are precisely specified and the AIFM’s discretion is re­ stricted by the investment terms, articles of associa­ tion or partnership agreement. In that sense, the definedinvestmentpolicyrequirementisnotmerely a technical element of the AIF definition, but the mechanism through which AIFMD distinguishes funds fromordinary companies. The difficult cases revisited Thedistinctionbecomesparticularlyusefulwhenap­ plied tovehicles that resemble investment funds eco­ nomically but remain corporate entities legally. Listed holding companies A listed holding company such as Berkshire Hath­ awaymay allocate capital, acquire anddevelopbusi­ nesses,disposeofparticipationsandholdanextensive securitiesportfolio.Economically,someofitsactivities maythereforeresemblethoseofaprivateequityfund. But the relevant question is not simplywhether it in­ vests.Itsshareholdersparticipateinacompanywhose boardretainsbroadstrategicdiscretion.Theboardcan adjust or redirect the company’s investment focus through ordinary corporate decisionmaking. The companyisnotnecessarilyboundbyapredefinedin­ vestmentmandate that canonlybe changed through fundgovernanceprocedures.Thishelpsexplainwhy an investmentoriented listed company does not au­ tomatically become anAIFmerely because its activi­ ties resemble those of an investment fund. SPACs SPACsillustrateadifferentaspectofthesamedistinc­ tion. Investors contribute capital and rely heavily on sponsorexpertise.YetthedefiningobjectiveofaSPAC is generally to identify and complete a business com­ binationratherthantomanageacontinuingportfolio pursuant to a defined investment policy. The target maybeunknownwheninvestorssubscribe.Thepro­ posedtransactionmayrequireshareholderapproval, and investors commonly have an opportunity to re­ deembeforecompletion.Corporatedecisionmaking thereforeremainscentraltothestructure.Thefactthat aSPACraisescapitalandultimatelydeploysthatcap­ italintoanoperatingbusinessdoesnot,withoutmore, turn the vehicle into anAIF. Treasury companies and concentrated asset exposure Treasurycompaniesholdingconcentratedexposures to gold, infrastructure or digital assets may appear even closer to singleasset investment funds. But the mere portfolio composition is not decisive. The key question is whether capital was committed under a definedinvestmentmandatethatconstrainsmanage­ ment,orwhethershareholdersinvestedinacompany whoseboardretains thediscretion tochange its strat­ egythroughordinarycorporategovernance.Concen­ trated investment exposure is therefore not, by itself, sufficient to transform a company into an AIF. The same reasoning applies where the company devel­ ops products or services for commercial customers while using investment assets as an input into those products. The fact that the company acquires or holds investment assets does not necessarily mean that it is offering investors anAIF. The nature of the undertaking’s commercial purpose and the gover­ nance framework within which its capital is de­ ployed remain relevant. Conclusion The investmentversuscommercialpurpose distinc­ tionisusefulbutdoesnotbyitselfdeterminewhether an entity is anAIF. The same applies to the holding­ companyexclusion,becausebothproviderelevantin­ dicators, but neither fully explains why some investmentoriented vehicles remain ordinary com­ panies while others fall withinAIFMD. The defined investment policy, however, provides a more useful lens.Itisnotmerelyadescriptionofwhatavehiclein­ tendstoinvestin.Itestablishestheboundarieswithin whichmanagementmay exercise investment discre­ tion and the governance framework through which those boundariesmay be changed. Once viewed through that lens, many difficult cases become easier to analyze. Listed holding companies likeBerkshireHathaway,listedprivateequitycompa­ nies, SPACs, family investment conglomerates and treasury companies all generally invest capital. They do not automatically become AIFs because their shareholders generally invest in companies whose strategies remain subject to corporate decisionmak­ ing,ratherthancommittingcapitalunderafundgov­ ernance framework built around a predefined investmentmandate. Put differently: the AIFMD boundary is not simply between companies that invest and companies that conduct a business. It is also between corporate dis­ cretionanddelegatedinvestmentdiscretionexercised withinadefinedmandate.Thatiswhythedefinedin­ vestmentpolicyrequirementdeservesmoreattention inborderlineAIF analyses than it usually receives. *Dr. Sebastiaan Hooghiemstra is a senior associate in the investment management practice of Loyens &Loeff Luxembourg. **Gabriel Storm is an associate in the financial regulatory practice of Loyens &Loeff Amsterdam. When Does a Listed Holding Company Become anAIF? Par Alvin JUVET, EconomisteUBP L a doctrine des banques cen­ trales recommande de ne pas réagir directement à un choc dʹoffre, à conditionquʹil soit tem­ poraire et que lʹinflationne soit pas déjà durablement supérieure à sa cible. Aujourdʹhui, aucune de ces deux conditions nʹest remplie. L’in­ flation sousjacente, mesurée par l’indice PCE, s’établissait à 3,0%en août et le conflit avec l’Iran s’enlise depuis plus de sixmois. Les prix de l’énergie ont rebondi en sep­ tembrealorsquelesprixdesproduitsraf­ finésauxÉtatsUnisontprogressédavan­ tagequenelelaisseraitprésagerleurrela­ tion historique avec les cours du pétrole. Si la hausse du prix de lʹessence pèse sur lʹinflation globale sans nécessairement contaminer le reste des prix, celle dudie­ sel peut nourrir lʹinflation sousjacente. Le diesel va directement alimenter la hausse des coûts des secteurs de l’agri­ culture,delaconstructionetdutransport. Et, au regard de l’intention des entre­ prises de monter leurs prix pour préser­ ver leursmarges, les risques de diffusion sont bien réels. Toutefois,unediffusiondel’inflationglo­ bale aux prix « cœur » (hors énergie et biens alimentaires) ne se matérialise que si la demande le permet. La consomma­ tion américaine reste aujourd’hui rési­ liente, comme en témoignent les ventes au détail du mois d’août et les nouvelles commandes dans les services qui ont atteint un plus haut de plusieurs années, selon l’indice PMI. Ainsi, le terrain reste favorable à ladiffusionde lʹinflation, et la Fed lʹa compris. Fautil pour autant quʹelle relève ses taux de près dʹun point de pourcentage, comme lʹanticipent les marchés monétaires dʹici un an ? Nous ne le pensons pas, pour deux raisons. Dʹabord, la hausse de l’essence freinera naturellement une partie de la demande. Elleagitcommeunetaxesurlesménages modestes, pour qui lʹénergie pèse lourd dans le budget. Ainsi, le consommateur peineraàabsorberdeshaussesdeprix,ce quiréduiralepouvoirdefixationdesprix des entreprises des secteurs concernés. Ensuite, rien nʹindique que la hausse des prix se transmette aux salaires. Pour que lʹinflation sʹinstalle durablement dans les services, il faudrait une boucle prixsa­ laires. Or le marché du travail américain nʹembaucheni ne licenciebeaucoup, et la croissancedes salaires est aujourd’hui en décélération. Sans ce relais, une accéléra­ tiondurabledesprix«cœur»semblepeu probable. Ces deux arguments plaident donc pour un resserrement de la Fed moins marqué que celui anticipé par les marchésmonétaires. La Fed a eu raison de durcir le ton : face à un choc qui menace la stabilité des prix et sa crédibilité, attendre aurait ris­ qué de reproduire l’erreur commise en 2021. Pour la suite, la hausse du prix de l’essence et la décélération des salaires militeront pour un resserrement moné­ taire limité. Selon notre scénario, les marchés moné­ taires prêtent à Kevin Warsh une trop grande fermeté, faute de bien connaître encore sa fonction de réaction. La Fed décevra les attentes des marchés monétaires ©Pexels