Agefi Luxembourg - avril 2026

Avril 2026 25 AGEFI Luxembourg Fonds &Marchés L es actifs privés entrent dans une nouvelle ère permettant enfin aux investisseurs de combiner performance à long terme et flexibilité. Par Alexandre SICLET, Investor Relations Private Assets, ODDOBHFAM Au cours de la dernière décennie, les actifsprivés sont devenus incontourna- bles dans les allocations des investis- seurs. Rendements attrayants, diversi- ficationparrapportauxmarchéscotés, accès à des moteurs de création de valeur différents : les arguments étaient convaincants. Cet essor reposait sur un compromis assumé : accepter l'illiquidité en échanged'un surcroît deperformance.Avecdes taux proches de zéro, la « prime d'illiquidité » était perçue comme une opportunité presque évidente. La stabilité relative des marchés cotés facilitait la gestiondes appels de capitaux, et le besoinde liqui- dité de court terme paraissait limité. Cette période a façonné des politiques d'allocation où la question de la liquidité n'était pas prioritaire. Mais le contexte adepuis radicalement changé avec la remontée des taux, une volatilité accrue et des exigences réglementaires renforcées. La liquidité devient un enjeu crucial et deux tendances majeures émergent : la forte croissance du marché secondaire et le développement des structures evergreen. Le marché secondaire des actifs privés a changé de nature. D'un marché opportuniste et relativement confidentiel, il est devenu un segment structuré, profond, organisé autour d'intermédiaires et d'équipes spécialisées. Les investisseurs peuvent désor- maiscéderdespartsdefondsou des portefeuilles entiers, non plus seulement en situation d'urgence ou de contrainte, mais dans un souci de gestion active de leurs actifs : rééquili- brer leur allocation, réduire le risque de concentration, cristalliser un gain ou se repositionner sur d'autres stratégies. Cette professionnalisation s'accompagne de nou- velles formes de transactions, notamment les opé- rations dites « GP-led » où le gérant organise lui- mêmeune solutionde liquidité sous formede fonds de continuation pour prolonger la vie d'un actif de qualité ou de restructuration de véhicules histo- riques. L'investisseur ne subit plus le calendrier de sortie ; il choisit entre vendre, rester investi ou aug- menter son exposition. La liquidité devient modu- lable, négociée, intégrée à la relation avec le gérant. Pour autant, lemarché secondairen'est pas lapana- cée : les prix restent tributairesdes cyclesdemarché, laprofondeur varie selon les segments et les fenêtres de transaction peuvent se refermer en période de stress. D'où l'importance, pour les allocataires, d'in- tégrer le secondaire dès la construction de porte- feuille : définir des scénarios de rotation, identifier les actifs à céder, sélectionner des partenaires secon- daires fiables. La liquidité devient une option stra- tégique et non une porte de sortie improvisée. En parallèle, le développement des structures evergreen redessine la frontière entre illiquidité et flexibilité. À la différence des fonds fermés tradi- tionnels, ces véhicules ouverts permettent des souscriptions régulières et des possibilités de rachat, souvent trimestrielles ou semestrielles, sur la base d'une valeur liquidative. Ils répondent à une demande croissante d'investisseurs souhai- tant bénéficier des primes d'illiquidité sans s'en- gager sur un horizon fixe de 10 à 12 ans, et sans gestion des appels de capitaux. Ces structures apportent une forme de « liquidité organisée ». Desmécanismes defiles d'attente, deplafonnement des rachats (gates), de délais de préavis ou de poches de liquidités permettent d'absorber les flux entrants et sortants. Ladiversificationparmillésimes et par stratégies réduit aussi le risque de dépendre d'un calendrier de désinvestissement unique. Pour l'investisseur, la courbe en J est souvent atténuée et lagestionde trésorerie simplifiée. Il est donc logique que ce nouveau format soit particulièrement prisé des investisseurs privés qui étaient, jusqu'ici, assez peu exposés aux actifs privés. Mais l'evergreen introduit un risqued'inadéquation entre la liquidité promise et la nature des actifs sous-jacents. En cas de choc demarché oude vague de rachats, la gouvernance desmécanismes de sus- pension et de gestion des valeurs liquidatives devient cruciale. Cette « semi–liquidité » doit ainsi être encadrée et comprisepar l'ensembledes parties prenantes. Le nouveau paradigme des actifs privés se dessine donc autour d'un triptyque :marchéprimaire,mar- ché secondaire, structures evergreen. Le primaire reste le moteur de création de valeur à long terme ; le secondaire offre des points d'entrée et de sortie plus flexibles ; l'evergreen fournit une enveloppede détention continue, capable de lisser les cycles et les besoins de trésorerie. Les investisseurs disposent désormais d'unepalette complète pour piloter leur exposition et leur liqui- dité. Dans ce nouveau cycle, les gagnants ne seront pas seulement ceuxqui accèdent auxmeilleurs actifs privés, mais ceux qui sauront orchestrer, dans le temps long, la liquidité aucœurmêmede leurs stra- tégies non cotées. La question n'est plus « liquidité ou performance »mais « quel niveau de liquidité, à quel prix et pour quel type d'investisseur ? ». Actifs privés et liquidité : un nouveau paradigme ? Opinion - By Shanu SHERWANI, Chief Investment Officer, KneipManagement S.A., Luxembourg A fewweeks ago, a colleague for- wardedme a private strategy note circulated among institutio- nal investors.What struckmewas not its viewon the conflict but a single line near the ope- ning: “our interpretation is that trouble for risk assets was coming anyway, for rea- sons that were apparent beforeMarch.” The author hadnot predicted the Iran war. But he had already identified the three structu- ral vulnerabilities that thewarwould expose. That distinctionmatters enormously whendecidingwhose analysis to trust. Most post-war research was reactive — institutions revisingtargetsinresponsetoanoilshocknoonehad fully priced. This note argued differently: that the equity bull market was already topping out, that the AI investment theme had been deteriorating since October 2025, and that the fiscal andmonetary stim- ulus powering markets since 2022 was already run- ning out of road. The Iran war was the accident that waswaiting tohappen, an amplifier, not a trigger. “The Iranwar didnot create the problem. It revealed it. The vulnerabilities were already there, the war simply removed any remaining ambiguity.” —ShanuSherwani, CIO If the war were the sole cause of current stress, the rational responsewouldbe towait for a ceasefireand resumethedeploymentplan.Butifitmerelyexposed pre-existingfragilities,theresponsemustbemorefun- damental. You cannot wait for the geopolitical noise to clear andexpect theunderlying conditions tohave resolved themselves. ThreeClocks ThatWereAlreadyTicking The first vulnerabilitywas thematurity of the equity bull market. By end-2025, investor positioning had reachedhistoricallyelevatedlevels,withmarketspric- ing continued perfection at a point where valuations left almost nomargin for disappointment. The secondwas theAI investment theme. The narra- tive that powered the Nasdaq to a 21% gain in 2025 had already begun to fracture byOctober. The ques- tion was no longer whetherAI would transform the economy, it was whether $300 billion of committed capital expenditure would generate returns that jus- tified the valuations. The third, most directly relevant to the Iran war, is what some analysts call the end of “peak reflation.” The fiscal and monetary stimulus driving markets sincelate2022waslosingmomentum.Ratecutexpec- tationswerealreadybeingscaledbackthrough JanuaryandFebruaryasinflationprovedstick- ier thanhoped. “Three clocks were already ticking before the war began.TheIranshockdidnotstartthem,itmadethem impossible to ignore.” —ShanuSherwani, CIO The war has now activated all three simultaneously. The shock is stagfla- tionary — it pushes prices up while slowing growth down. That combi- nation is the hardest possible envi- ronment for investors because the tools that normally work in a crisis stop working. Bonds, traditionally the safe harbour, now fall alongside equities when inflation rises because central banks cannot cut rates to help. Gold, which rallied 65% in 2025 and becametheretailhedgeofchoice,nowsellsoffalong- sideshareswhenpanichits,investorsselltheirbiggest winners first, and gold was the biggest winner. The hedge no longer hedges. Goldman Sachs has raised its forecast for US con- sumerpriceinflationto3.1%byDecember2026,well above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target. The Fed is caught: cut rates and inflationaccelerates; hold them and a slowing economy risks recession. JPMorgan now expects zero rate cuts in 2026 — a dramatic reversal fromthemultiple cutsmarketswerepricing just months ago. What the BigBanksAreActually Saying Three things are broadly agreed across major insti- tutions.First,thisisastagflationaryshock,notsimply an inflation problem that will pass quickly. Second, European assets are themost exposed as JPMorgan Private Bank explicitly recommended reducing European equity holdings on 19 March, describing the continent as the epicentre of the pain. Third, a market bottom has not been reached. Bank of America’sMarchsurveyof210fundmanagers($589 billion AuM) found professionals still 37% over- weight equities, not yet at the cash levels that accom- pany genuine market lows. Their sentiment gauge sits firmly in sell territory. “Theprofessionalswhomanagemoneyforalivinghavenot yet sold. That is not reassuring, it means the adjustment still lies ahead.” —ShanuSherwani, CIO Where banks diverge is on magnitude. Goldman, Morgan Stanley and JPMorgan maintain year-end S&P500targetsof7,200–7,800,assumingtheHormuz disruption is temporary. The private analysis I have reviewed sees the S&P 500 falling to 6,000–6,200 and Europeanmarketscorrecting20–25%forthefullyear. I findmyself closer to the cautious view, not because I am certain it is right, but because everymajor bank has beenmoving in the same direction since the con- flict began. The debate is not about whethermarkets will be weaker than January. It is about how much weaker and for howlong. The Single FamilyOffice Problem Unlike pension funds or endowments, SFOs are not subject to strict liability-matching or mandato- ry liquidity ratios. In theory, this gives them enor- mous flexibility. In practice, it often means they are less systematically prepared for precisely this kind of environment. ThetypicalLuxembourgSFO,andIincludemyown inthisentered2026withcashprogressivelydeployed into productive assets, European equity allocations increasedonattractiverelativevaluations,andstrate- gic plans built on a constructive macro backdrop. None of those decisions were wrong in 2025. The problem is that the 2026 environment has changed inwaysthataffecteachsimultaneously:theEuropean overweight is in the lineof fire, extendedbonddura- tion is exposed to rising yields, and gold is behaving like a risk asset for the first time. “The cash that felt like a drag during last year’s bull run is now the most valuable ass e t on the balance sheet.” — Shanu Sherwani, CIO There is also an illiquid portfolio dynamic that deserves attention. Capital call schedules on private equity and co-investment commitments are non- negotiable. In a year where liquid portfolio perfor- mance is under pressure, the forward cash flowbur- den of illiquid positions becomes a more material planningvariablethanitwasduringthebenignyears of 2023–2025. FiveAdjustmentsWorthConsidering I am not suggesting SFOs should liquidate portfo- lios or attempt to time the market. I am suggesting a conscious recalibration of the deployment time- line and a deliberate preservation of optionality through H1 2026. 1. Cash is now a strategic position, not a residual. When the tools that normally protect a portfolio stop working,cashbecomesthelastlineofdefence.Itdoes not grow, but it does not fall — and it gives you the abilitytoinvestatlowerpriceslater.BankofAmerica’s survey confirms most professionals have not yet raised enough cash to signal genuine panic, which is itself awarning that further falls lie ahead. 2. Europeisnotthevalueopportunityitappearedto be in January. Europe imports most of its energy, making it far more exposed to the oil shock than the US. JPMorgan’s European private bank team has explicitlyrecommendedreducingholdings.SFOsthat increased European exposure in 2025 should revisit whether the original thesis still holds. 3. The traditional defensive toolkit needs an upgrade. If bonds andgoldareboth failing, consider the energy sector companies producingor transport- ing oil and gas are seeing revenues improve directly from higher prices. Utilities, healthcare and essential consumer staples also tend to hold up better when economic conditions deteriorate. 4. Keep bond investments short. The longer the maturity, the more sensitive to interest rate changes. Inaworldwherecentralbankscannotcutrates,long- termbonds face continued pressure. Favour maturi- ties of one to four years over extending out to ten or fifteen inpursuit of a higher headline return. 5. Knowexactlywhenyourprivateinvestmentswill call capital. Map expected capital calls over the next twotothreeyearsandensureliquidreservescanmeet themwithoutforcedsellingatdepressedprices.Some private lending funds are already experiencing redemption pressures — review the withdrawal terms on any open-ended structures carefully. TheAutumnOpportunity The private analysis I referenced at the outset is not permanently bearish. It expects the correction to take approximately six months to complete, placing the best investment window in Autumn 2026 ahead of the US midterm elections, a view broadly consistent with Goldman Sachs’s year-end recovery scenario. MorganStanleynotes that technology stocks are bet- ter placed to lead any recovery thanmany expect: so many investors have been betting against them that when confidence returns, the rush to reverse those positions can itself fuel a sharp rebound. “Theliquiditypreservedtodayisnotdeadcapital.Itisoption- ality,theabilitytoactdecisivelywhentheentrypointarrives inAutumn 2026.” —ShanuSherwani, CIO For SFOs, theportfolioworkof the comingmonths is not simplydefensive. It ispreparatory. TheSFOs that emergefrom2026inthestrongestpositionwillnotbe those that avoidedall losses inH1. Theywill be those that preserved enough firepower to act decisively when the opportunitywindowopens. AFinalWord onProcess Theepisodethatpromptedthisarticle,astrategynote forwarded by a colleague, cross-referenced against several researchhouses, synthesised intoaboardrec- ommendationwithin days, reflects howSFO invest- ment processes need to operate in a volatile world. Singlefamilyofficesareleanorganisations:theCIOis oftenalso thedeal lead, theportfoliomonitor and the board presenter. The risk is not incompetence, it is informationoverloadand the absenceof a structured framework for rapidly evaluating conflicting signals. In a market environment that moves this fast, the annual review cycle is also no longer fit for purpose. The regime shifted in days, not quarters. SFOs need lighter-touch, more frequent check-ins that can chal- lenge strategic assumptions without waiting for the next boardmeeting. The Iran war did not change the fundamentals of sound investment management. It did remind all of us that a portfolio built for thewrong kindof crisis is, in the end, nodefence at all. * The views expressed are the personal opinions of the author as CIOof a Luxembourg-based single family office and do not constitute invest- mentadvice.Theprivatestrategynotereferencedwascirculatedamong institutional investors and is not publicly available. References to Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan and Bank of America reflect publicly available research circulated inMarch 2026. When the Playbook Breaks: How the IranWar Is Forcing Single Family Offices to Rethink Everything