Agefi Luxembourg - novembre 2026

AGEFI Luxembourg 22 Novembre 2026 Fonds &Marchés ByVirginieLEROYandLissieGOLDBACH,Managing Partners, Leroy&Goldbach A short communication and an Excel form fromLuxembourg’s financial regulator should change the conversation be­ tween fund sponsors and their Luxembourg platforms. The filing belongs to the plat­ form. Part of the preparation will fall to the sponsor. A whitelabel fund involves two parties. Theplatformis anauthorised thirdparty management company or AIFM(alternative investment fundmanager), independent or part of a larger financial group, which acts as the fund’s regulated manager. The sponsor, which the law calls the “thirdparty initia­ tor”, is typically an asset manager without its own Luxembourg management company, frommarkets such as Germany, Switzerland, France, the UK, the US or LatinAmerica. It brings the strategy and often the brand. We write mainly for sponsors; platforms face the same questions fromthe other side. This route to market remains open. What has changed is theproof behind it.Aplatformmust now beabletoshowtheregulatorhowitkeepsitsdistance fromthe sponsorwho brought it the business, and it will often need the sponsor’s data, contracts and co­ operation to do so. What changed On8October 2026 theCSSF, Luxembourg’sfinancial regulator, published a communication and a dedi­ cated form for Luxembourg fund managers taking up whitelabel business for the first time. The legal duty is older. It comes from an EU directive of 2024 (Directive (EU) 2024/927), which Luxembourg brought into national law by a law of 3March 2026, in force since 16April 2026 (Article 13(2a) of the 2013 lawon alternative fundmanagers andArticle 111(2) of the 2010 lawon investment funds). Where a manager runs a fund at the initiative of a third party, or intends to, it must give the CSSF de­ tailed explanations and evidence on conflicts of in­ terest. It must set out what it has done to prevent conflicts arising from the relationship. Where they cannot be prevented, it must explain how it identi­ fies, manages, monitors and, where applicable, dis­ closes them. The test iswho initiated the fund, notwhosename is on it. The law gives two examples: a fund carrying the initiator’s name, and an initiator appointed to carry out one of the manager’s functions. It defines neither“initiative”nor“thirdparty”.Onourreading, a dedicated fund launched at the request of a family office or a distribution partner can therefore be caught, even if that party’s name appears nowhere and it performs no delegated function. What the formactually asks Thelawspeaksofconflictsofinterest.Theformstarts with the business. The platform must describe its types of partners and their objectives, its fund types and its growth targets for this activity, then its organ­ isation, governance and monitoring. It must also set out the fees, including the share passed to the invest­ mentmanager, adviser, initiator or other distributors, andwhether the platformor the fundpays. The core of the formis five situations. Sponsor as investment adviser. The CSSF points to governanceandcontrolsovertheadvicereceivedbe­ fore the platform decides. Its example: a platform that also runs the portfolio should assess the advice independently and genuinely challenge it. In our view, a model in which recommendations are im­ plemented without any recorded challenge will be difficult to defend. Sponsor as portfolio manager. The platform stays legally responsible but hands the investing to the sponsor.TheCSSF’sconcernisthattheplatformmay lack the resources, expertise and independence to control the sponsor effectively. Sponsors should ask who at the platform understands the strategy well enough to challenge it. Platformrunstheportfolioitself. Thisisnosafehar­ bour. The CSSF names the risk that the portfolio manager follows the sponsor’s guidance or instruc­ tions, formally or informally. Valuation. The CSSF notes that initiatorsmay try to influence howassets are valued. For unlisted assets, where the sponsor oftenknows the investmentsbest andmaybepaidon theirvalue, giving input andex­ erting influencemust be visibly separate. Seats and roles. The form lists sponsor representa­ tives on the boardof the platformor the funds, seats on investment or valuation committees, a say in choosingor replacingserviceproviders linked to the sponsor,linkstoriskmanagement,complianceorin­ ternal audit, and a member of the platform on the fund’s board. Sponsors fromoutside the EU ForasponsorfromtheUS,theUK,Switzer­ landor LatinAmerica,managing the port­ folio itself raises a further hurdle. It must beauthorisedorregisteredforassetman­ agement and supervised, and coopera­ tion between the CSSF and its home regulator must be ensured. For alter­ nativefunds,asponsorwithoutsuch status needs the CSSF’s prior ap­ proval.TherulesforUCITS,theEU’s main fund format for retail in­ vestors, offer no such alternative. Where these conditions cannot be met, an advisory role may look like the natural fallback. In our view it brings its own burden, be­ causetheformflagsindependentchallengeofthe advice here. Whatever the sponsor’s status or loca­ tion, the platform remains responsible for compli­ ance. Sponsors should test this early and take homecountry advice. What theCSSF has not said Thecommunicationisbrief.Itsetsnodeadlineorlead time, does not say how to file and describes no ap­ proval step. It does not saywhenafilingmust beup­ dated. Because the form addresses a manager “intending” to do this business, we read it as a filing tomakebeforetheactivitystarts.Thatisourinterpre­ tation, not a statedCSSF rule. Two further openpointsmattermore. First, the com­ munication speaks of managers acting “for the first time”,whereasthelawalsocoversthosealreadyrun­ ning such funds. It does not saywhether, or how, es­ tablished platforms must document existing relationships. Second, it does not say what happens after the first filing when a platform takes on a new sponsor, or a sponsor changes role. TheCSSF canask formoreonthefirstfilingatanytime.Ourviewisthat the formis a gateway, while the legal duty continues. Platforms shouldkeepevidence for eachrelationship and raise these pointswith theCSSF inwriting. Why sponsors should act now In its 2026 priorities the CSSF announced a study amonga sample ofmanagers on thirdparty riskand the delegation principles of Circular 18/698, onsite controls of valuation organisation, and thematic re­ views of openended private assets funds. None of these nameswhitelabel business. It has also published a fine of EUR 71,500, without naming the manager, imposed on 9 July after a 2024 inspection.TheCSSFfoundthatasignificantnumber ofoutsideportfoliomanagershadnotundergonefor­ malised periodic due diligence under the manager’s own risk matrix. The manager also relied solely on theirconfirmationsofbestexecution(thebesttrading terms),withoutindependentverification.Thedecision isnotdescribedasawhitelabelcaseandconcernsear­ lierfacts.Thelessonstilltravels:selfcertificationbyan outsidemanager is not oversight. Platformsmustvetsponsorstoo.Foralternativefunds submitted for CSSF approval, the regulator’s pre­ launch readiness form, updated on 3November, has theplatformconfirmthat its duediligence on the ini­ tiatoriscomplete,passeditsapprovalcommitteeand is followedby ongoingmonitoring. What to do before the next launch 1. Mapyour role fundby fund. Brand, adviser, port­ folio manager or initiator only: ecord it, with every personlinkedtoyouonaboard,committeeorcontrol function. 2. Preparethefeechain. Showwhoreceiveswhatand whopays it, platformor fund. 3. Document theflows. Keepa recordof howadvice is assessed andhowvaluation input is given. 4. Preventfirst,disclosesecond. Thelawasksfirstfor stepstopreventconflicts.Wordinginthefund’soffer­ ingdocument alonewill not be enough. 5. Adapt the contracts. Advisory, delegation and ser­ vice agreements shouldcover informationandcoop­ eration for CSSF followup questions, and say who bears the cost. 6. Change howyou select a platform. Besides price, askhowit shows theseduties aremet,whether it has filed,andwhichresourcesstandbehinditsoversight. 7. Plan the timetable. With no stated review period, allow time for the file and possible questions. Ap­ pointing the sponsor to a delegated function also re­ quires prior notice to the CSSF under separate rules, so check both. Where existing assets move to a new manager, the form also calls for AuM (assets under management) tables. Abetter conversation None of this closes thewhitelabel model. We expect some platforms to become more selective and to ask for changes to governance and contracts. Sponsors who arrive with a complete file should be better placed to keep their launchon schedule. What is still to come The duty itself may change. In December 2025 the European Commission proposed, within its market integrationpackage,tolightenit:platformswouldtell theirregulatoraboutthearrangementwhentheyare authorisedandshowtheir conflictmeasures onlyon request. The Council Presidency’s text of 30 October 2026, tabled for ageneral approach (theCouncil’sne­ gotiatingposition) at the 9Novembermeetingof EU finance ministers (ECOFIN), keeps that approach. TheEuropeanParliament has yet to take its position, and trilogues (final EU negotiations) would follow. None of this is law, and today’s duty applies mean­ while. Nor would it remove the need for evidence, because a regulator can only be shown on request whatalreadyexists.Thesponsor’sfileisworthbuild­ ing under either version. Lawasof5November2026.Thisarticleisgeneralinformationanddoes not constitute legal or tax advice. White-label funds: what the CSSF formmeans for the next launch By Guy ERTZ, Chief Investment Officer, BGL BNP Paribas, DeputyGlobal CIO,WMBNPParibas T he Economist’s BigMac Index and theOECDEurostat purcha­ sing power parity (PPP) figures both try to answer the same question: Howfar is a currency’smarket rate fromthe level that would equalize purchasing power across borders. They do so howeverwith very different tools. The BigMac index treats a single, in­ ternationally sold hamburger as a proxy for a “basket of goods” and uses the domestic (US dollar) and for­ eign(euro)pricetocalculatean“implied”ex­ change rate. The euro would thus be undervalued when the implied exchange rate is lower than themarket rate andviceversa. Following the Economist in their yearly exercise published in July this year, theBigMac costs €6.19 in the euroarea andUS $6.22 in theUnited States. The implied exchange rate is thus close to 1.00. The difference between this and the actual exchange rate around1.12 suggests the euro is overvalued. By con­ trast,theOECDEurostatPPPisbuiltfromastatistical compilation of around three thousand consumer goods and services. Based on their calculations for Germany, they estimate the PPPvalue of one euro in dollars at around 1.43. This suggests that the euro is undervalued. The two signals can diverge because the theoretical foundations theyarebasedonare notidentical.TheBigMacapproachrestsonthe lawof oneprice – the idea that, absent transport costs and trade barriers, identical goods should sell for the same amount when expressed in a common currency. Indeed, in that case there wouldbeopportunitiestobuywhereitischeaper andsellwithaprofitintheothercountry. In practice, a Big Mac’s price is howeverdominatedbynontrad­ able inputs such as local labour, rent, taxes and franchise fees, which varywidely and are not subject to international compe­ tition. The OECD Eurostat PPP, on the other hand, aggre­ gates both tradable and nontrad­ able components in the proportions households actually consume. Adeeper theoretical reason for the split is the Bal­ assaSamuelson effect. The hypothesis argues that countrieswithhigherproductivityintradablesectors tend to have higher wages, which spill over into the price of nontradables, pushing overall price levels up. TheOECDnotes that “differences inproductiv­ ity are one explanation of this”. Indeed, poorer economies have lower wages and therefore cheapernontradablegoods,makinga sin­ gle product index appear to overstate undervalua­ tion in those locales. That observation isprecisely the mechanismBalassa (1969) (1) and Samuelson (1969) (2) described, and it explains why a basketbased PPP, which already incorporates the productivitydriven price structure across the whole economy, can in some cases yield a valuation opposite to the simple BigMac reading. Beyond economic theory: TheReality ofDollarDominance While PPPand the BigMac Index attempt tomathe­ matically estimate a “fair value” exchange rate Ken­ nethRogoffsuggests that theactual valueandpower of a currency such as theUSdollar are also governed bydeeper,more volatile structural forces. Inhis book “ Our Dollar, Your Problem” (3) , he argues that the era of absolute dollar dominancemayhave alreadypassed its “highwater mark”. He argues that rather than a sudden collapse, the dollar faces a gradual erosion drivenbyfiscal,demographic,andgeopoliticalshifts. ThissuggeststhatevenifPPPmodelssuggestthatthe dollar is “overvalued or undervalued,” this reality may be secondary to institutional stability. Rogoff warnsthatthedollar’s“exorbitantprivilege”,itsability to access cheap financing and act as a global safe haven,isunderthreatfrominternalUSvulnerabilities. Indeed, rising US public debt (approaching 125% of GDP)andpotentialpoliticalinterferencewiththecen­ tral bank independence could undermine the trust that anchors the dollar’s global role. Consequently, while a Big Mac index might sug­ gest a currency is “cheap,” the real risk to a global reserve currency lies inwhether its issuing govern­ ment can maintain fiscal responsibility and insti­ tutional integrity. Conclusion TheOECDEurostatPPPisderivedfromabroad,sta­ tistically weighted basket that reflects actual house­ hold consumption patterns and explicitly adjusts for the productivity differentials highlighted by the Bal­ assaSamuelson argument. It should thus provide a more reliable benchmark for assessing longrun cur­ rencymis valuation. The Big Mac Index remains a useful, easily under­ standableillustrationofthelawofoneprice,butitsre­ lianceonasingle,nontradableheavyproductmakes itpronetosystematicbias,especiallywhencomparing economies at different stages of development. Rogoff’sanalysisremindsusthatexchangeratevalu­ ation is only one part of the story. For theworld’s pri­ maryreservecurrency,thetrue“value”isinextricably linked to the stability of the institutions that back it. For policy analysis and crosscountry comparisons, the comprehensive PPP methodology remains the preferred tool for measuring purchasing power, but it must be pairedwith an understanding of the fiscal and geopolitical risks that define modern currency dominance. Given the current environment, it seems morelikelythatthedollarwillweakengraduallyover the coming quarters. 1)Balassa,B.(1964).ThePurchasingPowerParityDoctrine:AReap­ praisal. Journal of Political Economy, 72(6), 584596. 2)Samuelson,P. A.(1964).TheoreticalNotesonTradeProblems.Re­ view of Economics and Statistics, 46(2), 145154. 3) Kenneth Rogoff (2025), “Our Dollar, Your Problem: An Insider’s View of Seven Turbulent Decades of Global Finance, and the Road Ahead”, Yale University Press. When a Single Hamburger Misleads: Understanding the Gap Between Big-Mac and PPPDollar Valuations

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