Agefi Luxembourg - mars 2025

Mars 2025 21 AGEFI Luxembourg Fonds d’investissement Par Amine BENGHABRIT, Directeur général France et Benelux,Allianz Global Investors P our de nombreux investisseurs institutionnels, la dette privée (c’est-à-dire les titres de créance nonnégociés enbourse) est depuis longtemps incontournable. Entre 2019 et 2023, ce segment d’in- vestissement a augmenté de 70%pour atteindre environ 1.500milliards de dollars. Compte tenude la forte croissance dumarché pri- maire, comment s’étonner qu’un segment demarché se- condaire se soit développé entre-temps : les titres de dette privée secondaires. En conséquence, les in- vestisseurs institutionnels devraient égale- ment garder unœil sur ce segment. Les transactions sur lemarché secondaire, ou « secondaries », sont bien connues des investis- seursdusecteurducapital-investissement.Il s’agitdepartsde«secondemain»proposées par des investisseurs qui se séparent d’une partie de leur portefeuille. Ondistinguedeuxtypesdetransactions sur le marché secondaire : les « se- condaries » LP- led et les « seconda- ries » GP- led . Les transactions LP- led ont lieu lorsque les inves- tisseursdefonds(c’est-à-direles LimitedPartners,LP)ontbesoin de liquidités à court ou moyen terme ou souhaitent réorienter leur portefeuille. Ils proposent donc leurs parts de fonds sur le marché secondaire. Dans le cas des GP-led «secondaries» (General Partners, gestionnaires de fonds), en revanche, des parts de portefeuille qui n’ont pas été liquidées comme prévu sont proposées. Cela peut être le cas, par exemple, lors de la clôture d’un fonds etdeladistributiondesrendementsauxinvestisseurs. Ainsi,lestransactionsdites«tail-end»sontfréquentes, en particulier dans le cas des «GP-led secondaries», où les dernières entreprises du portefeuille d’un fonds sont vendues. Il apparaît donc clairement que les transactions se- condaires sont certes des transactions de « seconde main »,maisqu’ellesnesontenaucuncasdespartsde secondeclasse!Eneffet,selonladuréedufonds,l’en- vironnement de marché et la situation du vendeur, des opportunités intéressantes peuvent s’offrir aux investisseurs institutionnels. Il existe différentes pos- sibilités d’accéder aux transactions sur cemarché. Classiquement, et pour les grands investisseurs, cela peut se faire par l’intermédiaire des GPs ou des LPs eux-mêmes, c’est-à-dire par l’intermédiaire du ges- tionnaire de fonds ou des détenteurs de parts du fonds. Cependant, cet accès est souvent plus difficile pour les petits investisseurs institutionnels et les in- vestisseurs qui ont récemment décidé de s’engager sur les marchés privés. Ils investissent donc souvent aux côtésd’investisseursplus importants et plus éta- blis, ainsi que par le biais de fonds. Ces derniers ont souvent l’expérience nécessaire du marché et des transactions, et ont unaccèsdirect aux acteurs pertinents dumarché secondaire. Il ne s’agit pas seulement d’avoir accès auxprincipauxgestion- naires de fonds de marchés privés, mais aussi aux banques d’investissement et aux courtiers concer- nés, qui sont souvent le lien avec les investisseurs désireux de vendre. Actuellement,lestransactionsditesGP- led continuent de dominer lesmarchés secondaires. Cependant, on observe depuis peu que les LPs envisagent de plus en plus des options de sortie via des « secondaries» de detteprivéeenraisondelavolatilitédumarchéetdes changements dans l’allocation cible au sein des por- tefeuilles de dette privée. Dupoint de vue des inves- tisseurs, l’attrait des « secondaries» réside notamment dans lesdécotes réalisables. Enraisondumanquede liquidité, ces décotes sont souvent à deux chiffres et donc nettement supérieures à celles du segment du marché secondaire du capital-investissement. En outre,lesfondssecondairespermettentuneallocation plus rapide à la dette privée par rapport aux inves- tissementsdansdes fonds primaires. Par exemple, la due diligence - c’est-à-dire l’ensemble de vérifications qu’opère un investisseur en vue d’une transaction proposée - peut être effectuée demanière particuliè- rement ciblée, car les données de performance cor- respondantes sont déjà disponibles pour les fonds secondaires. Quelles sont les perspectives de croissance pour le segment de marché des opérations secondaires de detteprivée ?L’évolutionde sonhomologueducôté ducapital-investissement,quiaégalementconnuune forte croissancedans le segment demarchéprimaire correspondant, est encourageante. Selonlesprévisionsdusecteur,lacroissancedumar- chédes opérations secondairesdedetteprivéepour- rait être légèrement inférieure à celle des opérations secondaires de capital-investissement, principale- ment en raison de la durée plus courte des fonds et de la liquidité généralement plus élevée du marché des capitaux d’emprunt qui en résulte. Néanmoins, le plandirecteur des transactions sur le marchésecondaireducapital-investissementindique un fort potentiel de croissance. L’offre croissante de fonds secondaires offre ainsi aux petits investisseurs lapossibilitédebénéficierdusavoir-faireetduréseau d’investisseurs institutionnels expérimentés et d’uti- liser les fonds secondaires pour constituer leur por- tefeuille. Cela souligne le fait que les fonds secondaires ne sont pas des actifs de seconde classe, maisqu’ilspeuventaucontraireoffrirunpotentielde premier ordre. Les titres secondaires de dette privée : de deuxième main mais un premier choix By Sylvain CREPIN, Partner, Sebastian SCHIECK, Director & Kevin BORAN, Senior Manager at Deloitte Luxembourg I n the past two years, the num- ber of Luxembourgish invest- ment fundmanagers (IFMs) with at least one branch grewby 63%, fromonly 62 in 2021 to 101 in 2023. This trend shows that branch networks remain impor- tant in the industry. However, branches face operational chal- lenges, especially regulatory re- quirements. This article addresses twomainmodels IFMs use for branch oversight to reduce regula- tory impacts on daily operations. IFMs need to ensure robust regulatory decision-making, policies, and gover- nance across their operations. By central- izing these aspects, they can maintain consistencyandcompliance. Centralized management helps unify compliance ef- forts, risk management, and reporting processes, which are crucial due to the stricter regulatory environment. Branches often act as centers of excel- lence for distribution, improving client service and market penetration without needing separate licenses in each mem- ber state. In some cases, they also lever- age local expertise to include services such as portfoliomanagement or valua- tion support, offering cost efficiencies. However, establishing and maintaining branchesrequirecarefulevaluationoftheir financial return and strong oversight mechanisms to integrate them into the central management framework effec- tively.Whilecentralizedoversightremains common, more IFMs are considering a hybrid model where branches help with oversight tasks. Branches can support oversight efforts by using local expertise andreducingthecentralworkload.Setting up such oversight centers of excellence within branches can lead to cost efficien- cies and better compliance monitoring. However, it’s important to ensure these models meet regulatory requirements, which candiffer by jurisdiction. Centralizedmodel for strong compliance and riskmanagement An IFMis responsible for thedailyopera- tions and investment funds’ administra- tion. Oversight functions within an IFM are crucial for ensuring the company op- erateswithin legal, regulatory, andethical boundaries.Thesefunctionsprovideinde- pendent and objective assurance that the company’s operations are effective and aligned with its strategic goals. The over- sight framework typically includes key components along the second and third linesofdefense:compliance,riskmanage- ment and internal audit. Aboutone-thirdofLuxembourgishIFMs delegate internal audit functions, while most handle compliance and risk man- agement in-house. These functions usu- ally constitute the main substance of the IFM and are a crucial part of the man- ager’sregulatoryengagementinitshome member state. Centralizingthesefunctionsattheheadof- fice allows IFMs tomaintain strong com- pliance and risk management standards. It ensures all branches operate within the same framework and provides a central view of the IFM’s entire activity. Most IFMs prefer the centralized oversight model due to its robustness and opera- tional efficiency. It limits the number of full-time employees needed for oversight andensuresclearcommunicationwiththe home state regulator. In thismodel, branches report directly to the head office and follow IFM internal policies. The branchmanager is the only person directly involved in oversight matters at branch level. This approach works well for most IFMs because of the EU’s unified requirements, allowing ef- forts branches to focus on their core busi- ness, usually on sales and distribution. However, the centralized oversight model has its limitations. For instance, while it ensures compliance with CSSF requirements for a Luxembourgish IFM, some host member states may require additional compliance and reporting for local branches. It is common for a regula- tortorequirealocalAMLofficerasanex- tensionof the headoffice’s second line of defense. Depending on these require- ments, IFMsmight transition to a hybrid model, particularly when branches han- dlemultiple activities. Ahybridmodel PublishedinAugust2018,theCSSFcircu- lar18/698establishedthatthebranchman- ager is fundamentally responsible for compliance andoversightwithin their re- spective branch. This regulatory frame- workrequiresbranchmanagerstouphold specific obligations related to anti-money laundry(AML)andcounteringthefinanc- ingofterrorism(CFT).Nevertheless,there is a growing number of IFMs going be- yond these initial requirements. One common approach is to leverage personnel inbranchoffices for local over- sight functions. This includes gathering reports, data, and ensuring compliance with regional regulations. Having local employees offers several advantages: they are more attuned to local market conditions, cultural nuances, andregula- tory environments. They can respond quickly to local issues and provide real- time insights to the head office. This lo- calized oversight helps the IFM adheres to regional regulations and can adapt swiftly to new legislative changes. For compliance, some IFMs prefer to hire local compliance officers who possess in- depth knowledge of local regulations. Theseofficersperformregularcompliance checks, handle local regulatory inquiries, and train branch employees on compli- ance matters, all while staying aligned with the head office and the conducting officer in charge of compliance. This ap- proachensurestheIFMbenefitsfromspe- cialized expertise and maintains high compliance standards across all regions. Nevertheless, regulatory requirements mandate that compliance decisions and reports must be consolidated at the head office, even if each branch has its own compliance officer. Some IFMs use branches as centers of ex- cellenceforportfoliomanagement,anarea whereLuxembourghaslimitedresources. This approach leverages local market ex- pertise and talent, allowing the IFM to offer both riskmanagement andportfolio managementwithinthesamelegalentity. Althoughportfoliomanagersareapartof central portfolio management function and under the conducting officer’s re- sponsibility, this setup strengthens the business case for branches. Finally, having local oversight can be beneficialwhenmanagingexternal serv- ice providers. Branch employees can en- gagedirectlywith local serviceproviders to ensure service level agreements are met and promptly address any issues. They can conduct on-site visits, review performance reports, and maintain con- tinuous communication with service providers, in coordination with the re- sponsible conducting officer in the head office. This is especially useful for IFM managingcross-borderinvestmentfunds with local fund administrators and cus- todian banks. This local oversight sup- ports, but does not replace, the conducting officer’s responsibilities. Canbranches be oversight hubs? Some companies are trying to improve their operational efficiency by using branches as oversight hubs. In this plan, a branchwouldhandle all thedataanalysis andoversight tasks, while themainoffice would only look at the final report. This could make oversight more efficient and cheaper. However, it would need to fol- lowbranchoversightrulessincebranches can’t reviewthemselves. It’suncertainifregulatorswouldallowthis decentralization or if it would affect the mainoffice’srequirements.Therearecon- cerns about whether the head office and the appointed conducting officers can ef- fectively control the IFM and all its branches. Nevertheless, if allowed, this would allow a brand-new operating model for branches andoversight. Conclusion IFMs must navigate a complex land- scape of regulatory requirements and operational challenges as theydetermine the best approach for structuring their oversight functions. While centralized oversight at head office ensures consis- tency, unified compliance, and stream- linedreporting, leveragingbranchoffices offers the advantages of localizedexpert- ise, responsiveness to regional regula- tions, and operational flexibility. Some IFMs are adopting hybrid mod- els that combine these strategies, utiliz- ing branches to aid in oversight tasks while maintaining strategic control at the head office. However, thesemodels must be carefully evaluated to ensure theymeet regulatory standards and do not compromise the integrity of the oversight process. More aggressiveoperatingmodels are so far only ideas. We have come through a long period of increased substance re- quirements and the possibility to erode this drive by utilizing branches is cer- tainly not the right direction. Ultimately, the approach chosen should align with the IFM’s organizational structure, regulatory obligations, and strategic goals, ensuring robust compli- ance, effective riskmanagement, andop- erational efficiencyacross all levels of the organization. We expect the updated Circular 18/698 to provide more details on regulatoryobligations, potentiallyan- swering someof thequestions and ideas. Review of branch governance models for IFMs